ads

Slider[Style1]

Style2

Style3[OneLeft]

Style3[OneRight]

Style4

Style5

brilliant perspective and analysis courtesy of new author and face-melter, dubber

In "Developing an Offensive Gameplan", Brian Billick, using years of statistical data, identifies the four main areas critical to an offense's success (or attributable to its failure).

They are:

  1. Turnovers (pretty self-evident)
  2. Explosive Plays (defined as runs over 12 and passes over 15, given an even turnover margin, teams who garner at least 2 more explosive than their opponents will win about 80% of the time)
  3. Red Zone Efficiency
  4. Success on First Down (success defined as 4 or more yards). (The math behind this is a successful 1st down will populate a shorter 3rd down, which is easier to convert.)
I kept statistics concerning these four areas while watching the Seahawks and the Rams. This was an excellent game to apply this study to, because I generally feel the respective defenses of these two clubs are better than their offensive counterparts, and both punters, kickers, and coverage units had excellent games.

This puts the onus on the offensive gameplan and decision making.

As a side note, I have done this a couple of times now, and while the reports are getting better, I think keeping track of a couple other items (1st down run/pass ratio, and 3rd down conversions by distances) would be helpful. For the future.....

So..........
  1. Turnovers were even (one each)
  2. Explosive plays............few and far between, but they were correlated to scoring drives, notably the only touchdown in the game, which was set up courtesy of the game's biggest play (61 yard pass play)----------the Seahawks garnered this bomb, as well one more total explosive overall.
  3. 2 visits apiece, with the Seahawks coming away with 10 points to the Rams 6. The penalty in the red zone for the Rams was killer..........
It was probably these two categories that won the Seahawks the game.

I really didn't care who won this game, but of particular interest to me was the first down statistics, which bear out an important lesson from which coaches can learn.

4. First down

I took note of the yardage gained on every first down of the game. I computed an average. More importantly, I also took note of what happen from a conversion standpoint (IE, getting another first down) on first downs that garnered 4 or more yards, AND those that did not.

If I may put the cart before the horse, the Seahawks had 30 first down opportunities to the Rams 19.
  • The Seahawks averaged 5.5 yards on first down
  • The Rams averaged 4.2
While that tells the tale, it is also slightly misleading........obviously, whether the offense gains 13 or 50 yards on 1st down, they get another first down........and that 50 yarder can bolster my average enough to cover up my overall inefficiency on first down.

More important is to observe the RATIO in which I experience success on first down, not my average 1st down yardage.

  • Of the 30 times the Seahawks had a first down, they gained 4 or more a total of 17 times (57 %).
  • Of the 19 times the Rams had a first down, they gained to gain 4 or more a total of 9 times (53 %).
A big advantage for the Seahawks was their ability to overcome gaining less than 4 yards on first down.........they went ahead and converted 38% compared to the Rams 22%.

This was not due to a proficiency on 3rd down and long (in fact, both of these teams were generally sucky on 3rd and medium to long)..........a large part of this game was actually won and lost on SECOND DOWN!

The Rams (perhaps due to that first quarter bomb and the way the Seahawks were able to recognize and attack man coverage) played softer, zone coverage on 2nd down. Couple this with the Seahawks willingness to throw high percentage, risk averse passes on 1st and 2nd down (which is pretty ballsy when you are rolling with your backup quarterback), and you have a recipe for getting back into a manageable 3rd down situation.................
Here's the real kicker, and if you take nothing else from this, take this (remembering these teams are very poor offensively): Combined, the two team had 26 first down plays that gained 4 or more yards, and of those, only 6 failed to result in another first down.



That means that 77% of the time either of these teams gained 4 or more yards on first down, they ended up converting for another first down.

So, how is this helpful?

Go back to those couple of games where you felt like you didn't execute offensive, but should have. Not the game you blew a team out, and not the game where you were blown out........but that game that was close, or that you should have won, but your offense just struggled. Go back and look at just the yards gained on first down..................see what that tells you.
THE FOLLOWING IS THE SECOND OF TWO POSTS ON THIS SUBJECT, ADDRESSING SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO ADD TO FUTURE ANALYSIS: FIRST DOWN PLAY SELECTION AND THIRD DOWN CONVERSION PERCENTAGES.

Charting first down is really the most time consuming part of this exercise. Turnovers are easy to count, as are red zone visits and explosive plays. Charting first down production means I must be completely focused on the television (something that rarely holds my full attention for hours on end).

I think 1st down run/pass ratio would be a huge addition, but I want it to be more structured than merely listing percentages........I would like to have some way to account for variance. For example, if I say a team threw 75% of the time on first down, that may be misleading if they throw a ton of screens. Also, there is a difference, in my mind, between taking a PA shot on first down, and taking a 3-step and throwing quick game. As a side note, while I believe the overarching theme of successful first downs should be unpredictability and balance, I would (personally) skew my first down gameplan more toward quick passing game than PA. I'd rather have the higher probability of 2nd and medium than risk an incompletion and leave 2nd and long.

Remember, an incompletion means you failed to gain 4 yards on first down, and are now off schedule...........and when the defense is better than you (a situation both offenses faced last night), you MUST stay on schedule.

Not that I wouldn't (and don't) take shots on first down, it just wouldn't figure predominantly into my general gameplanning practices.........

The type of PA also makes a difference........booting and throwing the comeback or the flat route is higher percentage than dropping straight back and throwing the NCAA route off run action.

And I understand, most PAP's have check downs, but I would like to have some way to delineate between taking a shot, and moving the pocket/still throwing high %.....which, given TV's horrible angles, would be hard.

At any rate, I would love anyone's thoughts on how to break this down.

Maybe the following 5 categories would work: quick/short passing, Verticals, PA's (maybe look at the difference between "going deep" and "high %"?), Runs, and Screens?
As I think about, perhaps screens could be sub-divided even further, as perimeter screens and slower developing slip or middle screens have entirely different functions for an offense.
Personally, a perimeter screen is like call sweep, and I consider it a safe way to get the ball in space (and get my 4 yards). Meanwhile, the latter mentioned screens are more like "home run" swings against a pressuring defense (lump them in with "PA shots").

3rd down

The really interesting thing Billick found about 3rd down is the conversion ratios for long, medium, and short were pretty standard. There wasn't a ton of deviation from the best to the worst offenses. For example, most teams convert about 80% of their 3rd and 1 situations, and convert a low percentage of 3rd and longs.
Doesn't matter if you are the Patriots or the Dolphins.

The difference?
The better offensive teams excelled at have MORE 3rd and short opportunities, while the bad offensive teams routinely faced drive killing (and turnover riddled) 3rd and long..........a direct result of good teams have first down success.

Still, it would be fun to chart that conversion ratio, maybe doing that a couple of times would reveal something about 3rd down philosophy.

As a final note, it was evident on 3rd down how much the Rams were still holding Bradford's hand...........their gameplan called for them to run only one formation on third and long (3x1 open with a compressed 2 and 3).........this kind of simplicity works just fine in high school, but in the NFL it's a different story.
I plan on taking some of the ideas in this second section and applying them when I do my next study (I'm thinking Colts/Jets), so if any of you have categorical or organizational suggestions, I'd love to hear them.

About ytttr

This is a short description in the author block about the author. You edit it by entering text in the "Biographical Info" field in the user admin panel.
«
Next
Newer Post
»
Previous
Older Post

No comments:

Post a Comment


Top