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THE EDGES OF CONCISION


A couple of weeks back, just before the holiday, I was in Washington DC for another profoundly boring, tedious, and ultimately, pretentious academic conference. After giving my talk and fielding an hour or so of numbing questions I went to the hotel lounge to unwind with the help of my two best friends, Mr. Jameson and Mr. Glenfiddich. I was lucky that night because I managed to grab the TV before the fireplace and monopolize it – a good move indeed because the boors who eventually descended like locusts would undoubtedly not have wanted to watch something as stimulating as the game between Iowa State and Oklahoma State that fine evening. Now, no doubt because of the good company of my two aforementioned friends, I was just a bit distracted and unable to fully digest and appreciate what was unfolding in Ames that night, but I knew I had found something quite appealing to my oh so prosaic senses, especially when the Cyclones had the ball.

I got back the next day to Madison in time to watch another interesting match – that between Baylor and Oklahoma. And this is when, with the help this time of two other friends, Earl and Lady Grey, along with a healthy dose of lemon combined with a quick shot Ms. Brandy (muddled, of course), it all started to dawn on me, almost like the initial testament Joseph Smith experienced somewhere in New York state. It all began when one of the prophets, Matt Millen, declared in no uncertain terms that if Baylor wanted to be successful against OU that they needed to move RGIII around so as to change his launch points and prevent the Sooner D from teeing off on him. For a moment, I agreed with the prophet and considered myself, with bit of self-loathing, fortunate to be in a position to take in his divinatory powers. But then something happened: the game continued, Baylor continued, by and large, to keep RGIII in the same place, and eventually the Bears won.

That night I went back and watched the ISU-OSU tilt again and noticed the same thing; hardly any pocket movement. This jogged my memory a bit and sent me back to my Arizona State cutups, which brought my attention to something I had completely taken for granted at some level or another: none of these teams protect their QBs by changing their QBs’ launch points. Does that mean that they do not move the pocket? Of course not. Only that when they do so it’s primarily to isolate a single receiver on an easy throw, usually in a short yardage situation; in other words, when they move the QB it is not because they necessarily believe that it will help them protect him more effectively.

For anybody well-versed in the fundamentals of protection, this all seems counter-intuitive, right? I mean, after all, a stationary QB is a sitting duck just waiting to get blown apart by a defense that simply needs to stay in its lanes in order to bring their pressure home? How then do these teams do such a great job of protecting their QBs, especially when they are most of the time releasing not three, but four and five guys and are thus never protecting with any more than six people? If we pause to think about it for a second or two, the answer becomes self evident: all these teams secure their QBs by ensuring that the A and B gaps are always solid and by protecting their edges by way of their KEY screen games that come off of their inside zone schemes. Since Baylor, OSU, ISU, and ASU aggressively use their KEY games they are able to displace rushers and thus widen the edge thus increasing the distance a potential rusher must cover in order to get home. But this is only applicable if the defense continues to roll the dice, as it were, because the KEY game itself forces a defense to consider the potential costs and benefits of bringing such pressure.

This is yet another example of concision. By formulating and integrating packages so that they protect one another, not just the QB as a physical being, but concepts in and of themselves, they are able to reduce the number of things they need to carry in any given game. For all these teams, the KEY game along with whatever versions of ROSE and LINDA they run work to protect not only their respective 2 and 3 man SNAG games, but also their Shallow and Drive packages as well.

In a perverse sense then, protection is as much about the periphery as it is the center.

Protecting Against Risk: Iowa State

This is usually a weird time of year for most programs.  The season has ended and now your Saturdays exist in unmetered time with no pressing needs to breakdown the next opponent.  No more cramming as much as you can into your day to make sure no stone is left unturned to find a competitive edge.  Now, all you can do is build for the future and remain hopeful in your underclassmen while you cycle through the flashbacks of your season.  This dead silence at the end of the year always comes suddenly, leaving us asking, “Now what”?

It is this time of the “season” that we can take a step back and slow down without consequence.   When under the deadline of the season, there is little time for introspection or second-guessing.  So now that we aren’t faced with the task of treading water, what would be the best use of your staff’s time? It isn’t researching a new scheme, installing new plays, or trying to innovate a new clinic talk.  This off-season, try re-evaluating the efficiency of your offense.  Rather than making things more difficult by adding plays, find ways to simply reduce the risk within your scheme.   How can you protect your core plays to that defenses can’t simply take them away?
A case in point we can use is the I-35 shocker in Ames this past Friday.  While exciting, I’d hardly call a game with 8 turnovers (and countless miscues) “great”.  However, the game did provide a decent exercise in risk management for Iowa State.  Oklahoma State is one of the best teams in college football this year and truly outmatched the Cyclones in every area.  What aided Iowa State in the overtime victory wasn’t necessarily certain plays, but how their system allowed them to play within themselves and maintain their comfort zone. 
With Freshman quarterback, Jared Barnett, the Cyclone offense could keep his workload light through a minimalistic approach of moving the football.  Much like the modular approach of Noel Mazzone we’ve discussed before, the Cyclones were going to run zone and zone-read to establish their inside run game.  They protected this series through KEY (flash) and MICKEY (flash draw) on the perimeter.  The rationale is, a defense can either put 6 in the box to even up on the perimeter (put them in a better position against the flash screen) and be vulnerable to frontside zone or a backside keep.  If a defense loads the box with 7 defenders to take away your zone and zone-read game, they open themselves up to an explosive play by a free receiver on the perimeter (see the comments section of Mazzone Revisited). 
If these plays are just viewed by themselves, they aren’t all that sexy, and are quite cheap.  What is particularly interesting about this pairing and witnessing it in this game, was how ineffective they were early in the game (particularly the key screens).  Tom Herman and staff stuck to the game plan and used these plays to diagnose the appropriate response, leaving little responsibility to burden their young quarterback with.   Because they continued to stick with the formula (inside-outside-inside compliments), they were able to slow down an athletically superior defense and open them to this horizontal stretch of the field throughout the game, climaxing in the 2nd Overtime ( 3 successive inside zone runs) for the win.

More Running from the Gun: Robert McFarland

Welcom to ISU
With recent stops at Stephen F Austin and Iowa State, Robert McFarland (no longer in Ames), knows a thing or two about getting production with limited rosters (THAT's coaching).

Featured here is an exhaustive teaching tool covering the run game standards from the gun (speed option, power, zone).

TEMPO CHECK

Expounding on previous themes of dictating the course of a game on offense through varying tempo speeds, this time by way of Iowa State and their OC, Robert McFarland.

With similarities to the previous Blake Anderson post on multiple speeds, Iowa State attempts to keep a defense off balance with hard cadences at a no-huddle pace. This is predicated on three sideline signal callers (assistant coaches or graduate assistants).

  • One signaller is designated to provide the personnel groupings, tempo, and formation.
  • The next signal coach will be responsible for relaying the play call.
  • The last signaller will be relaying a dummy call (that may or may not include actual signals used) to discourage signal-stealling from opponents.

The sideline will provide the information in this sequence:

  1. Huddle / no huddle
  2. Tempo: Able/Baker/Charlie
  3. Motion & Formation
  4. Play Call

The following will detail the process in which they operate this tempo. Once the ball has been whistled dead, the offensive line rushes to get set at the new ball spot. The specialists, particularly the tight end / fullback, will look to the sideline to see what personnel grouping will be included in the upcoming play. This will determine if they remain in the game, or if their particular personnel grouping dictates that they come off the field on this play.

With the appropriate players in the game, the formation and motion will be signalled in. Players keep their eyes on the first signal caller (and disregard the others) until the given formation is set.

Once set, the specialists will look to get the play call. Only the specialists know the play signals, the linemen only know the tempo calls (and rely on the audible call of the quarterback for the play call).

The Cyclones operate at three different speeds; able, baker, and charlie.
Intuitively, these simply note what sound the play will be run on (on 1, on 2, on 3rd count).

ABLE

Able is ISU's simple, no-huddle, first-sound tempo. No plays will be checked and all plays will be snapped on the first sound in the cadence.

The players will race to the ball spot, see the "Able" tempo in use, get set and receive the play call. The quarterback gives the play call twice "44.....44" (inside zone to the right) and the line will put their hand in the ground ready to play ball. The quarterback initiates the cadence, "Set.....Hit!", the ball is snapped, and the players race to the next ball spot and repeat the (sideline signal) procedure.

Video examples of first sound cadence being run by ISU.


ALPHA CHECK @ Yahoo! Video

BAKER

Rather simply, everything is the same as "ABLE" speed with the exception that the offense will review with the sideline/Offensive Coordinator before continuing the snap cadence (this is Blake Anderson's "OC" tempo). The coordinator now has the option to change the original play call or 'green light' the first call (and execute the original call).

As an example, the pre-snap to snap audible would sound like;
"Right – right – baker –baker" [ formation + tempo] called by quarterback
"8 man 8 man" [front ID] called by center
"indy girl – indy girl " [play call (iso lead to the right) ] called by quarterback
"set..... hit!" [cadence]

The specialists would then look to the sideline (tight end would stand up out of stance and look to sideline). From here, the play can be checked (based on alignment, pre-snap look presented by the defense) or the original play ("indy girl") can be continued. If the former, the play would be called out and repeated by the quarterback and he would go through the cadence. If the latter, he would declare a "green" call ("green, green") and go through the cadence (running the original play called).
Video examples of "Baker".



BRAVO CHECK @ Yahoo! Video


CHARLIE

Obviously, not a call used much (I couldn't find any clips where this was utilized, and McFarland admits he rarely uses it), but the practice is in their repetoire. When Charlie tempo is declared, the first call will always be a dummy play call signal, followed by a "green" call. The key here is to lull the defense into jumping the second count and or getting them to show their hand (with two previous attempts at baiting them) of what their post-snap intentions (coverage/blitz) are.

An example would sound like:
"left – left – charlie –charlie" [ formation + tempo] called by quarterback
"8 man 8 man" [front ID] called by center
"Hawkeye boy – Hawkeye boy " [play call ("hawkeye" is a dummy call, go figure) ] called by quarterback
"set..... hit!" [cadence]

Players stand up and look to sideline and receive a different call.

"Oakland boy – Oakland boy " [play call (option left) ] called by quarterback
"set..... hit!" [cadence]

Players freeze, look up again to the sideline and receive the confirmation (of the previous play called) or a check (in this example, a check).

"Indy girl – Indy girl" [play call (iso lead right) ] called by quarterback
"set..... hit!" [cadence]


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