BLACK

Much ado has been made of the importance of tempo in modern football.

Nowadays, it is less about what you are doing (option, power, air raid), and more about HOW you do it (huddle, different tempos, crazy fast).

The reasons why one goes no huddle are well versed. The main reason, as we have learned from our basketball counterparts, is to control the tempo of the game. The offense sets the pace, and whatever the philosophy, CONTROLLING that pace is a decided offensive advantage.

While some live in extremes (see Oregon), most teams find value in altering the tempo, either to the specific situation (2:00 time or kill clock time), or to simple prevent the defense from “settling in”. Like placing defenders in run/pass binds, attacking multiple areas along the LOS, and vertically and horizontally stretching zone droppers, varying tempo is just another way to make a defense stress, and ultimately, to break.

The point is, if you aren’t up on varying your pre-snap tempo, you need to be.

While this article is about POST snap tempo, it was necessary to talk through the philosophy and importance of pre-snap tempo in order to appreciate how post snap variance is also vital.

I’m going to use the offense I know as an example, but this is applicable to every system.

For our purposes, I want to examine two mainstays in the shotgun spread: zone read and flash screen.

The zone-read was the revolution of the past decade. By adding an option control on the backside of IZ, shotgun teams found they could run the football as well as their pro-style counterparts. Nowadays, a 6 man box is not in and of itself enough to keep a 10 personnel team from running the football.

The “ride and decide” meshing between the QB and RB creates a certain stimulus, to which the defense must react.

Your “reaction” defenders (namely, LB’s and DB’s) must maintain gap integrity while diagnosing and discerning who has the football. By it’s nature, the zone read takes time to develop. While defensive pressure can disrupt other running plays, zone blocking was designed to be gap sound and prevent penetration. In general, the BIG plays on zone read (and zone in general) come when a defense starts acting (aka, poking and hoping), rather than reacting. The very nature of option football also takes advantage of flying around without purpose.

So, the best reaction (post snap) is to fit into your run responsibility, diagnose whom the ball carrier is, and THEN rally to him.

A heavy zone read team will get a defense into this type modus operandi within a couple series.

Our second play, flash screens, do so much for a spread team.

Beyond the purposes of this post, perimeter screens force defenses to occupy and play in space (must line up properly), and are easy ways to get the ball to an athlete (like Crabtree).

For the purposes of this article, they are also a great way to vary that post snap “ride and decide” stimulus of the zone read, of which the defense just got a steady diet.

Essentially, a flash screen has the same run fits as sweep, it just threatens about twice as fast.

So, we have moved from a play that requires a defense to be gap responsible and react slowly, to a play that demands they get there NOW! After a steady diet of either stimulus, the defense will be less ready (less conditioned) to handle the other, simply by virtue of having altered their post snap decision-making process.

I’m gonna call on my dogs to explain this a little more.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings, I get food.

The bell rings….Hey, where did all this slobber come from?

THE BIG POINT:

The analogy of a boxer has been used to describe many things as it pertains to offensive play calling, and we can now add helping to relate the idea of post snap tempo to the list.

A boxer switches between short jabs and big hooks/cross/uppercuts for many reasons. You pound (weaken) with your jabs. You get an opponent use to defending jabs, then, at the opportune moment, you throw one of the other aforementioned strikes to do real damage.

For our purposes, these strikes also compliment each other in the manner (speed and position) in which strike. Throw nothing but jabs, and you might as well be tickle fighting a real boxer, but when you can mix it up, changing the speed and position of the assault, your opponent can’t find a rhythm.

In football terms, keeping a defense “off rhythm” is the name of the game.

The following is a synopsis of what I consider the finest, free playbook on the internet:

Ted Seay (who, despite our never having met, has influenced me greatly) now has this gem in it’s 4th edition (available here). Schematically, 10/20 personnel Wing-T that combines series based runs with modern horizontal and vertical stretches is my cup of tea. Even if it is not your brand of football, I stand by my sentiment that EVERYONE concerned with offensive football should read this document.

In particular, as feeble an attempt as it may be, I would like to review Mr. Seay’s concept of “unity of apparent intent” (UAI). My intention is certainly not to add to this idea, nor do I trust I can adequately rehash it. My hope is to relay enough information that your interest is peaked and you will do yourself the service of reading about the “side order of football”.

WHAT IT IS…

The UAI is all about deception, a key component of the Wild bunch offense (and every other scheme). Starting at page 154 of the linked document, Mr. Seay artfully ties military strategy with football philosophy, creating his theory of attack as it pertains to offensive football. Again, go read the document for this valuable insight, as the scope of Mr. Seay’s theory (The Tao of Deception) is another article in and of itself. For now, I want to focus on what this means from a series based approach.

Creating conflict, in its most simple form, involves attacking a defender’s over reaction to a base play.

The above diagram is a crude drawing of the curl-flat concept, where by the Flat Defender ($) is placed in a no-win situation. He can either cover the out route and allow the Curl to materialize behind and inside of him, or he can sink to the curl and give up the easy throw to the out.

It is a typical 2 on 1 stretch that many offensive passing concepts seek to create, and unless the flat defender receives help from one of his teammates, the only thing stopping the offense from running curl-flat all the way down the field is a lack of offensive execution.

So here is what happens:

The cornerback (C) will only allow 10 yards completions happen right in front of him for so long before he starts playing the curl (instead of his deep 1/3 responsibility). Attacking overreaction (cheating of assignment, over aggression, etc.) is what series based play calling/offensive structure is all about.

Another crude drawing, but the wheel tag is an excellent way to attack a CB who is jumping curl routes. Essentially, we are attacking the primary responsibility of a player who has abandoned it in favor of “plugging the dike” somewhere else.

So, that is a simple example of what we mean generally by “creating conflict”. The UAI, however, is about the details. It’s about making Y’s out and wheel routes stem the exact same way. When two things look the same, but end up attacking a defensive in ways that are not only different, but in fact complimentary, then you have developed the unity of apparent intent to your advantage.

Imagine the CB has a great position coach….one who is determined to make cover 3 work against this little curl-flat with the wheel tag package. He decides to teach his CB to key #2 (Y) in his backpedal. He notices that on Curl flat, Y will vertical stem his route before breaking it hard to the flat. On the Wheel, however, Y will stem straight toward the sidelines and start to veer up field.

So, if Y stems vertical, then the CB has the ability to press the curl…….if Y immediately releases to the flat, then the CB knows he must play the wheel. The pattern of an offensive player’s movement tells the defender where he needs to be.

When it comes to making offensive decisions about “how do we run this route”, etc., this must be in the forefront of the play designer’s mind. Routes need to stem the same way (and runs need to look the same too) in order to keep the defense in a state of confusion/uncertainty. When an offense eliminates cues as to their intention, thereby gaining UAI, the offense functions far more efficiently.

For Mr. Seay, this culminated in how he blocked Fly sweep and the FB compliment off it for his Wild bunch.

Coming from a Wing-T background, Mr. Seay’s original version had pulling OG’s on the sweeps. After much study, he finally decided to switch to zone blocking everything.

The result is a truly UNREADABLE offensive series that starts with Jet Sweep (with OZ blocking). The compliment is the front side IZ run with the FB, which Mr. Seay’s research has shown actually averages more yards per call than the sweep. The OL movement and backfield mechanics look EXACTLY the same on both plays, leaving defenders without a reliable visual key.

We talked about curl-flat and Jet Sweep series, but this concept needs to be built into everything you do, regardless of your offense flavor.

Obviously the ability to execute is paramount, but winning football games against good competition comes down to details. That guy running the Jet needs to move at the same pre-snap speed and purpose whether he is getting the ball or not. We can’t cheat initial movements too much (though a little may be advisable in certain situations), and especially if we do not have a GOOD REASON for it.

Again, great stuff from Mr. Seay.

NEW NOTE:

I appreciate the comments.

Per Mr. Seay's invitation, here is a link to some new WB material:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25907198/Wild-Bunch-5-0-2010

Enjoy it.......I know I will!

First off, I learned an important rule for blogging: don’t make promises you can’t keep.

I apologize to those who were sitting on pins and needles for my article……I hope both of you can forgive me…….especially you, Mom.

In all seriousness, I do apologize for the delay, I didn’t keep my word to get this to you in a timely manner, and that is not cool.

With that out of the way, let’s apply this study to a season’s worth of statistics.

Before we begin, MAD props to coach fingerz42, a member of Coach Huey's X's and O's site.

Seriously, if you find this to be of any use, send him a PM and let him know you appreciate his work. He was absolutely awesome, and this article would not be possible without him.

Coach fingerz42 is the first year head coach at "High School X". Suffice to say, they struggled in year one (hence the anonymity). Coach fingerz42 brought a new identity to the program, and the growing pains were evident. The team battled to a 2-8 record, and averaged 9 points a game. The adversity of learning a new scheme was further complicated by the loss of his starting quarterback in week 2.

With all due respect to Coach, the poor performance of his 2010 offensive squad makes this analysis especially exciting. The more an offense's talent outweighs that of the defense, the less important 1st down efficiency becomes. If you can have a holding penalty (1st and 20), a reverse for 1 yard (2nd and 19), a QB scramble for 6 (3rd and 13), and then throw a comeback for 15 yards consistently, then either your team is full of studs, or this must be your opponent:

Don’t laugh, these guys may win the Big East’s automatic qualifier in 2011

Team X's lack of offensive prowess, coupled with staring down a massive talent gap nearly every game, made staying on schedule exponentially vital, and that is something Coach told me he plans on scrutinizing more carefully in 2011 (good for him).

Before we examine Team X's first down statistics, let's see how they did in the other 3 areas Billick considers vital to offensive success:

1. Turnovers: Team X turned the ball over 26 times in 10 games. Obviously, stemming this tide is priority number one, of which Coach is well aware.


2. Explosive Plays: Coach didn't keep stats, but when you average under 200 yards a game in total offense, you can figure this is also an area in which Team X needs to improve.


3. Red Zone Efficiency: 9 scores in 19 trips. Lack of opportunities and low efficiency.

Despite the obvious shortcomings in these categories, the case could be made that they all trace the root of their trouble back to first down efficiency.

Falling behind (on the series and the scoreboard) leads to more passing, and when you are a run first team with a backup quarterback, throwing in predictable situations is a recipe for disaster (picks, punts, and poor field position).

This serves to highlight an importance game planning aspect for run first teams: If you plan on attacking a defense 80% run and 20% pass, merely having that ratio in the final box score doesn't mean you accomplished anything. If your 20% came in predictable situations (3rd and long, 2:00 situations, etc.), then there is exists NO semblance of balance, and conversely, there is no defensive imbalance.

Offensive football is all about stressing the defense as a means to the ultimate end: crossing the goal line. There is nothing wrong with wanting to run the ball 80-90% of the time, as long as you avoid predictability.

First Downs

What really got me excited about Coach's team was his breakdown of conversion percentages for those first down plays that garnered over and under 4 yards, respectively: On first downs where the offense gained 4 yards or more, they went to convert 80% of the time.

On first downs where the offense failed to gain 4 yards or more, that percentage fell to 31%

Think about this....here's a team that to the naked eye can't seem to do anything right (again, all due respect to coach fingerz42, almost all of us have been there), and yet, when they manage to gain 4 or more on first down, they manage to move the chains a whopping 80% of the time!

Now, the rub comes when we examine the frequency of these +4 gainers.

On the season, Team X had 194 first down opportunities. On 129 of these (66%), Team X failed to gain 4 yards.

Sidetrack

The big question for Coach this off-season is to figure out how to create more 2nd and <6. In fact, from the conversations we’ve had, I know he is already working on his first down success through 2 important endeavors that all coaches need proficiency in:

Our staff calls it the R&D department……..recruitment and development; THE foundation of any program.

The following conversation was overheard at a clinic between coaches from rival schools (as far as any of you know):

Coach 1: "We just couldn't stop you guys from hitting the speed out. We used our Tango technique, then switched to the Dragon Claw alignment, and even whipped out the Lombardi Kung Fu grip and we STILL couldn't handle it. What are you guys doing to make that that route so effective for you?"

Coach 2: "Our fast kid runs it."

Word?

All this effort into analysis and stat tracking will flesh out an extra game or two on your season (which can mean a world of difference), but the real wins come in the off-season.

Practical Applications

So, how can we make this work for us?

While I place a great deal of emphasis on analysis as it relates to decision making, there is no need to go all Beautiful Mind on your football team…

If you know a team runs Power Right out of the Pro-I forty-three percent of the time when on the left hash facing 2^nd and 5 in the 3^rd quarter when the wind is over 10 mph blowing from the west and the blah, blah, blah……….

Focus on the big things, and the little things will handle themselves.

Our staff (limited in time and man power) has started to focus on the follow areas:

1. First down tendency


2. 3^rd down tendency


3. GL tendency

We look at our opponents respective offensive and defensive strategies in these three areas and plan accordingly.

We also find 16 year old kids can remember a couple 1^st down tendencies (2 main runs, favorite pass), and a couple situational items (3^rd and long…..draw, verticals, etc.).

I wish you happy hunting. I hope this helps, and if you have analysis of your team, please feel free to share.

And again, one last BIG shout out to coach for making this article possible.

I was checking out smart football, and I enjoyed Chris' recent article on underdog strategy (great stuff).

However, Mr. Brown ends his article with some troubling findings, courtesy of the gentlemen over at Advance NFL Stats.

Given the choice between kicking or receiving, conventional wisdom is to always take the ball. The only time you consider kicking is when you defer your decision to the second half, as a strategic tactic. If you use that strategy, then you always elect to receive after halftime.

This is not ground breaking to anyone……you want the ball, unless you can get it later.

What Advance NFL Stats discovered, however, is the team that receives to open a half will actually LOSE a majority of those respective halves.

This flies in the face of conventional wisdom, even challenging that long held, irrefutable tenant of successful football: maintaining possession.

I have only one plausible justification, albeit an anecdotal explanation (and I am wide open to other thoughts).

I'll take the word of this man:

You may recognize this gentlemen (Elmer Layden, Notre Dame Head Coach 34'-41') from a more famous picture from his playing days:

I remember reading "It Was A Different Game: The Elmer Layden Story" when I was in high school (I highly recommend it both for history of the game, and insight into Coach Rockne), and in the chapter where the late coach was espousing his football strategy, he mentioned he often considered a quick kick on 1^st down when backed up against his own end zone.

Being 18 and knowing it all, I immediately wrote this off as archaic football strategy from the days of no facemasks and 7-3 thrillers.

Maybe, without the use of the internet and fancy algorithms, Coach Layden knew something we lost………that field position, not possession of the football, is the prime asset.

Interesting.

The average NFL kickoff return nets 22 yards.

If the defense forces a punt inside their opponent's 40, and given an average net punting yardage of 40 yards, then the starting field position for the team who kicked off can be expected anywhere from their own 30 to mid-field, segments of the gridiron where the odds of a drive ending in a touchdown increase substantially.

In short, it is (or may be) better to kick-off and then receive a punt, because of the relative real estate you are afforded in those respective situations.

This also serves to underline the important role garnering explosives plays in stemming the field position tide. If one can complete a 20 yard pass during the drive, and subsequently can punt from their opponent's 40, then they have relieved their burden and placed it on the other team.

Finally, in another fine article from Advance NFL Stats, this dynamic serves to highlight the importance of a player like this.

I don't think it is enough to make me not want the football, although I have some serious rationalizing to do to overcome the weight of these findings.

If anyone has any other ideas, feel free to share.

I just wanted to drop a line and document a trend within football, though I don’t have a particular conclusion in mind, but one you should be able to witness as it takes place during your favorite game. This is no profound Michael Lewis “Lawrence Taylor skill set arcing to the deliverance of a Michael Oher”, merely just a broad capture of a recent trend that could possibly lend itself to a forecast of things to come.

In back-and-forths I’ve been having with football guys I esteem greatly (some are contributors here) for the past year, and touched on a little in comments at smartfootball.com, my assertion is that the growing trend in football will see a defensive adaption featuring more off-man match from 1-high (or zero ) coverage [with a majority of this played out of untraditional nickel/dime packages].

As detailed previously in the Charlie Strong Orange/Tan package, Nick Saban Cover 1/9 Rat, Bo Pelini’s Spinner/Nickel Bomb – the off-man coverage (from primarily a 2-high shell) allows for efficient disguise, protecting against 4-verticals, while accommodating superior numbers against the run and maximum pressure on the passer. If I can ever get around to articulating my thoughts (with sexy powerpoints), we would also have these trends noted from Gregg Williams, Dom Capers, and Rex Ryan.

It all essentially boils down to the pattern-match concept and how it has/is being used as an adaptation method. “Pattern match” really is just man-match (by the time you get 1.5 seconds after the snap it all ends up being the same thing). As detailed in the Saban series last year, man coverage married to zone coverage with ‘pattern match’ is not all that much different; the response will be nearly identical. The growing trend in playing “pro-style” catch man coverage technique is what accommodates the “untraditional” personnel matchups and the deep 1-high safety with pressure. This is a look that will become increasingly more familiar as you watch football this season.

The thing is, in the 80s and before, the game primarily was founded on exclusive man-to-man, 1-high defenses (because the traditional offense didn't align for a vertical/horizontal stretch). These defenses were WYSIWYG and ‘primitive’, usually with bump-and-run and 8-man fronts to match the standard 2-back offenses. As the trend shifted from 1-high MOFC to 2-high MOFO zone defenses, offenses counteracted with multi-faceted 1-back run games (with running quarterbacks). We arrive to where we are now, where the old ‘bump-and-run’ coverage is considered a barbaric dinosaur and press-man is welcomed by pass-first offenses.

Hopefully, this will jumpstart me a bit so that I can start fulfilling my obligations to this blog again.

Recently, on this site, as well as on others, the term “match zone” has gained a great deal of currency. There is good reason for this: without question, match zone is the defensive technique in pass coverage that is currently most in vogue throughout all levels of advanced football. No doubt because of the pioneering advances made by Nick Saban, Gary Patterson, and a few others in diagnosing the pattern combinations and route distributions that are the hallmark of every sophisticated passing game, match zone techniques and coverage concepts serve as the foundation of virtually every defensive structure. In a sense, match zone has breathed new life into the 1-Hi looks that for a while looked incapable of handling the vertical threats posed by today’s spread offenses. However, in another sense, and I will be the first to admit that I may be completely wrong here, match zone may simply be today’s Tampa 2, another knot in the tactical and strategic evolution of defensive football.

This will be short piece, and much to my chagrin, one bereft of the ever useful power-point diagrams of my colleagues on this site. My goal in writing is to play a little bit of devil’s advocate, to point out what I view as some structural deficiencies that undergird match zone concepts, and in so doing, suggest that perhaps the old way of defending space is not as antiquated and insufficient as the prevailing defensive orthodoxy of today seems to suggest.

Let’s begin by boiling away the fat of match zone. In layman’s terms, what is match zone? At its core, match zone is a man/quarters concept predicated on upon a 3 on 3 triangle with a linebacker. Now, if we pause to think about it for a second it is not difficult to see from what match zone as both a concept and technique and concept evolved, and here, I’m not simply repeating Brophy’s citation of Saban’s remarks on its historical evolution dating from his days with the Cleveland Browns. Match zone evolved out of the Banjo bracket concepts that dominated college football throughout most of the 1990s. I coached in the then Big 8 when Kansas State was making its rise in football and very well remember the aggressive Banjo concepts they used in the their under-coverage as a way of bracketing and walling off the shallow routes that were then gaining in popularity amongst college offenses. And I think we all know that Banjo is essentially a man technique played within a defined zone: defender plays his man until said man leaves his zone and is then passed off to the adjacent defender.

Match zone builds on banjo by adding a number of additional elements into the mix, the most important two being a hyper-developed concept of pattern reading, or pattern matching to be precise, and the RAT, about whom I will write in a future post. For now, I will focus primarily on pattern matching. I use the term “matching” and not “reading” here not simply to reinforce Saban’s language, but because pattern matching and pattern reading are not interchangeable concepts. To match a pattern, it is necessary to first read the pattern. A defender matches an offensive players route when he diagnoses his intention; he’s then matched on him in what amounts to man-to-man coverage. This here is what I see as the rub about the very term “match zone,” for it’s really a misleading coinage, because what it is in reality is not match zone, but really match-man. What distinguishes match-zone from pure man is the way in which “matching” as a technique is integrated within the schematic structure of the defense as a whole. This is where the pattern reading aspect of match zone comes into play, the aspect that enables it to diagnose threats and cover them not simply with a lone defender, as in pure man, but in coordinated collaboration with another defender whose action’s are predicated upon his ability to read, diagnose, and match the pattern in question.

Now, I think it should be pretty clear where I’m going with this. Because defenders are taught to match the route of the receiver they by default become chasers. In other words, when defenders match a route they are in effect chasing it; defenders thus are not covering space, but rather receivers. This is why I prefer the term match man to that of match zone. The term zone implies space and area; match zone teams do not cover space, but people.

Why am I making a big deal about this? I’m harping on this because I believe that there are some profound structural issues with this concept as a whole, especially versus spread offenses. The first problem should be self evident. Since everybody is chasing in match zone the concept is suspect versus any team that has a QB that can run. A good friend of mine who coached for a long time in the Big 12, a predominantly match zone conference, told me that if Vince Young played today he’d run for over 2,000 yards. I have no reason to doubt him. With the exception of Robert Griffin at Baylor the Big 12 today is quarterbacked by kids who can chuck the ball, but who are not much of a threat with their legs. Today, if I were still coaching, I’d be tempted versus a heavy match zone team to line up in Empty a lot and run a great deal of QB draw, as well as motion a back into the backfield from Empty in order to run zone read, and later Jet.

Another problem with Match Zone is its lack of physicality. How is it possible to blast a receiver if you’re always chasing him?

Now, I’m aware that the RAT, to a degree, functions as the punisher in most match concepts, but RAT is only one player and thus one that can be identified and schemed around. I know this sounds counterintuitive, man teams are rarely ones that punish receivers on a routine basis. Here, I’m drawing on my friends insights regarding the 2006 Colorado defense. CU was a 2 shell team that played a lot of quarters, 2, and Tampa 2. They did nothing fancy except squeeze down zones and tackle extremely well. All one needs to do is to watch their tape against Texas Tech and Kansas. Versus both teams, CU aligned in some type of a two shell or four across look and pretty spot dropped the entire game. What made their spot dropping effective, as opposed to, let’s say, what VaTech did versus Boise State earlier this year, was that CU’s people were dropping and reading at the same time; in a word, they a had a keen sense of what was developing behind them.

I will conclude my remarks with some words as to how I, as Run-N-Shoot guy, would treat match zone. To be totally honest with you, I would rather face a match zone team as a Run-N-Shoot coach than a pattern reading – spot drop team (more on this formulation in my next post). Why? Pure and simple: match zone teams, especially those that are heavy fire zone ones, by and large, always end up, regardless of shell, in a 1 Hi look. I can thus tell my people to disregard the other 6 generic shells we use to categorize coverage and instruct them to focus their attention on attacking the technique of the defender charged with matching them. So, for all intent purposes, match zone takes the thinking out of things for my receivers because for as far as they’re concerned all they’re facing is man.

What is interesting about this, historically speaking, is the fact that match zone as a both a technique and concept reinforces something that John Jenkins spoke about frequently during his days with the USFL Gamblers and later with the Houston Cougars: all zone coverage eventually becomes man at some point or another. Jenkins remark was particularly on point for his own offense, because the Run-N-Shoot is a vertical stem offense, especially his variation of it. Even back in the 1990s Jenkins was teaching his receivers, regardless of coverage, to attack the individual technique of the man against whom they were stemming their route; he was less concerned with the overall scheme of a coverage than with the individual technique of a defender. The explicit goal of every receiver, even versus soft looks was to collapse the cushion and the force the defender to play man. In a way, match zone does this, but in a more economically effective way; for, the receiver does not even have to collapse the technique in order to get the match man technique he desires.

when confronted with an interior ass-kicking muther sucka like Ndamukong Suh, THROW SCREENS!


Tire them out with change of direction and plays away from them.

Along with pursuit and tackling (fundamentals) of defense, is the rather academic application of adjusting your defense to the offensive threat you face. In most defenses the player that drastically alters what the defense actually is, the strong safety.

A lot has been discussed in the last 20 years ( in the wake of the evolution of 2-high defenses) about the role, prototype, and alignment of the “strong safety”. You likely hear this ad nauseum if you are forced to listen to any NFL broadcast, about “bringing a safety down”. Great, sure sounds awesome, but what does it mean and why?

This discussion will cover the ceaseless pendulum swing between offensive and defensive attacks and counterattacks that evolves each season. Back during your “daddy’s day” when receivers were in 3-point stances, everyone played with 2 backs and sometimes 3 backs in the backfield. To even the odds against this, defenses began stuffing more and more people in the box (1-high) to stop the run-heavy attacks.


To create more breathing room, offenses found a way to adjust by removing a back, forcing the defenses to expand with them (eliminating a defender from the box).

The more offenses expanded, the more defenses had to adjust and eventually relying on 2-high defenses to remain viable against the vertical passing game. The advent of 1-back looks (made popular by Dennis Erickson in the 80’s with WSU and Miami) became the (then) “spread”, even though Erickson admittedly says the entire point of going 1-back for him, was to RUN the ball. It may sound odd, but when we take a look at WHAT 1-back looks do to a defense, it becomes apparent what the offense is looking to exploit.

The fundamental element in defense is supporting all available run-gaps that an offense presents. If there is one gap not accounted for, then an offense has an immediate path for yardage. 2-high defenses became all the rage in the late 90’s into this current generation because of this 1-back adaptation. First things first, what is the offense presenting the defense? How many backs are in the ball game? How many tight ends?

“21” (2 backs, 1 tight end) typically gives you a 2-back, pro-formation look. With 2 in the backfield, you will likely be threatened by some type of 2x1 look. The extra man in the backfield (fullback / H-back) provides an extra gap for the defense to support (just like a second tight end). With 2-back looks, you are immediately threatened with lead runs (iso, power, sweep) that will put 1+ offensive player at the point of attack.



“11” (1 back, 1 tight end) will give you a single-back look. This immediately eliminates the threat of lead runs (unless you have to contend with the new [Rodriguez-type] spread, where the QB is a rushing threat). With only 1 back, you will end up with a 3x1 or 2x2 set that can stress a defense with 2 inside verticals (passing threat), but be without that extra (run fit) gap.

Although adjusting nicely and bottling up 1-back looks, the defense, through this expansion away from the ball, was opening the middle of the field. This became a void offenses would later exploit by turning shotgun ‘spread’ formations into run-heavy attacks.

The Next Step
Now to the current trend for defenses, how do they get an ‘extra hat’ at the point of attack (and beat the offense to the punch)? As outlined by people like Nick Saban, the MOFC defense allows a defense to put more defenders in the box and allocate the most people to stop the run, inside-out (protecting the middle of the field, first). To achieve both the security of covering the immediate threats of alignment (split) and also get the benefits of shutting of the middle of the field, defenses are finding ways to show 2-high, then bring a safety down late. From here, with pattern-matching principles, the sky is the limit for defenses and the way they attack the ball. With pattern-matching, you can now actually play “man”(to-man) as well as expand to match the passing threats. This arithmetic enables a defense to also bring 5+ man pressure, drop linemen in coverage, and or anything else you can dream up.

In the following clips below, you can see how personnel groupings essentially telegraph what formations you will see on a given play. In each example, the defense is going to play a 1-high MOFC coverage and bring the safety down for run-support/cover-down. The trick is, it typically is showing a 2-high look at the snap to play the traditional coverage-matchup-with-formation game that offenses are looking to exploit.
vs 21 personnel



vs 11 personnel


Then, you can get creative and not only protect the middle of the field, but also bring pressure (1-high fire zones).


This current trend of defenses gleaning the best attributes of schemes into some quasi-natural selection process creates a deadly and effective method for accounting for fundamental principles of good football. Defenses, with the usage of proper coverage support, pattern-matching principles, and multi-talented linemen (ability to drop to cover receiving threats), are able to open a maelstrom of disguised looks. Defenses can present one look at presnap and morph its use to fit any and all offensive threats after the snap. No longer are defenses limited by walking out on displaced receivers (in man) or staying cemented within the box to stop the run. With these principles of adaptation, the chalk can be held by defensive coordinators a while longer.

Wahoo, made it to my 100th post!
Now to cover my favorite subject....more quick passing game from a spacing concept, the Snag Route as taught by former NC State and NY Jets coach, Noel Mazzone.

2 Man Snag Concept
Although the same route as Gunter Brewer's 3-step Snag (that essentially is a strong side flat,snag,corner read, ala Coverdale Mesh), Mazzone introduces this as a 2-man game into the boundary. It features a standard mesh split or wider by X (7-8 yards), who's angle of departure is towards a depth of 6 yards of B gap (looks just like shallow cross, mesh, etc). Once the first inside backer crosses his face, he sticks his foot in the ground, spots up, and gets his eyes to the quarterback. Complimenting this spacing is the hot swing into the boundary by the back.

The back takes 3 hard steps parallel to the line of scrimmage (3 steps into the boundary, 5 steps into the field), and then down hill to the landmark of inside the edge of the numbers. He should catch the ball AT the line of scrimmage. The whole point is to stretch the WLB (curl-flat defender) as quickly as possible. The back is trying to out-leverage the OLB as quickly as he can. The explosive quickness of this play is what is important to train with your quarterback. He takes 3 quick steps and is thinking, "give the ball (on plant) to the back, hitch (hit the spot), open and move (hit #3)."

“it just a basketball game off the will backer….1 to 2, simple”

Mazzone cautions,"Don’t make the mistake of telling your quarterback to throw to the back (“I think Johnny was open in the flat. Why didn’t you throw to the back?”) as he’ll start doing what we DON’T want – hold the football." The entire concept is built in hot – for empty protection - it has answers for everything.

This is an efficient concept. This is a 1st down play, to me, this is like calling toss sweep or power. It is a high percentage play.

What problems does snag encounter? 1st problem – man 2nd problem – Cover 2 Versus man, snag just becomes an issue of running away from the defender, and /or turns it into a rub. In both Cover 2 or man, the quarterback can simply convert the snag routes into mesh – it fits with his reads and progression already. Additional Coaching Points against Man;

• X - if X feels man coverage, he will run through the WLB's inside hip, making him bubble over the X and not come underneath (creates space for the back). With the snag, in the event of blitz, if everything voids, he is going to be hit on the move. Keep the X moving, don’t get him thinking. When in grass, stay in grass - Green grass means go
  


• F – if they feel its man coverage, the QB will make a "bullet" call, which changes the hot swing to a bullet – this release is set right through the feet of the X (creates the rub on the WLB) at a severe angle towards the sideline.

Passing game is about spacing and timing It is important to keep the quarterback in a rhythm, to train guys to keep moving. The second hitch should be a throw on the move; plant, hitch, on the move. Coaches should move their quarterbacks into throws - don’t let him sit back there and get nervous. The third throw here should be “on the way out” (ala Steve Young), where he is in position to throw the third receiver or take off on a run (or throw it away). The third look should be drilled as a running throw. Additionally, you've gotta play fast, and you can’t ever question your QB’s decision.

• If he doesn’t feel it on the hitch to the flare, go to snag
  


• If he doesn’t feel it there throw it on the move, throw pivot

For the 3rd read receiver, he is to run a ‘punch and pivot’ route. This punch and pivot is aimed at the first inside backer he sees. This will likely be the MLB. The receiver should get close enough to the Mike to punch him. If the MLB gets aggressive (reroute) then he has to settle his feet in anticipation of contact, so he won't be able to recover and cover/run with the pivot. While at NC State, Phillip Rivers, for his career at NC State in the 2 man game was 88% for 8.2 yards per throw. Rivers was so adept at the Snag concept, that he campaigned Mazzone to run a mirrored version of this, a double snag with both backs flaring (this became what is known as Scat)

We ran it to open a game (vs UNC), to shut him up,

and show him his play doesn’t work…. We ran it, ran it again, then kept running it to show him it wasn't a good idea.... same formation, same play…..9 times in a row (UNC) 9/9 and on the 9th throw it was a TD.

3 Man Snag
Post safety (1-high) – work 2 man snag (weak) Split safety (2-high) – work 3 man snag (strong)

All this becomes is the snag concept with the third receiver added to the strong side. You add a route by Y, just like how Shallow and Mesh are packaged. Its still just 2 man snag, we’ve just added another element to it. With Cover 2, they have 5 underneath, not 4, so you should be looking to work strong, stretch horizontally, and blow the top off the coverage vertically.



Adding Y corner or Y basic (dig) to this 3 man package creates all the answers required.

• If SLB sits on the snag, then you have the smash with the corner and shallow RB
  


• If the MLB is covering the snag mostly, throw Basic ( dig)
  


• If the OLB, Sam, is covering snag – throw corners

How do you protect your best plays?

You have to have something in to keep your bread-and-butter plays on the edge. You have to make the defense pay, to hurt them, if they (try to) take away your best plays.

(rocket screen develops just like snag / inside zone) This helps protect 2-man snag, 3-man snag, mesh patterns and inside zone because it all develops the same post-snap but stress the defense in an entirely different way.

Dealing with numbers in the box - How do you deal with it?
When you become effective running the ball or with this inside quick passing game, the defense will have to load the box with 8-9 defenders to stop you. To overcome defensive number superiority, you could gain an advantage with a running quarterback (zone read / fly) …..but what if you don’t want the QB to be a runner? You have TWO OPTIONS “look” and “stay” These concepts are just like throwing uncovered and are just as 'cheap'. LOOK If the cushion on the outside receiver is greater than 8 yards and the corner has outside leverage.....the receiver takes 1 step, right now, and GO! (to open grass)

This guy (Favre) really like to run them

We started calling it in the huddle…

we’d call “I-right 60 Power, X look”

But “this guy” just did it on his own whenever he wanted.

STAY
If the receiver is out-leveraged by the DB but has a significant cushion, he takes 1 step, and stays. This is just like a flash screen to the perimeter and works especially well in conjunction with the run game (shown here with inside zone action).
If they add to the box, we’re getting post safety….take advantage of matchups outside when they load the box.

Route read/pattern match with the shuffle

After spending years teaching the traditional back pedal, I have found the most efficient method another way. For the past few seasons, the "Saban Method" (though, clearly not his invention as it is as old as his days in Cleveland) of the shuffle and pattern-match.

Though playing true Cover 3, we 3 step shuffle into 3 step (short) game (under 12 yards).
Corner reads QB into the shuffle while periphing #1 to #2 receiver.
The 3-step shuffle puts the corner at a depth of 10 yards, which would be on top of any short game stick into their route, which helps the corners remain in phase with receivers and any vertical threats. As a general rule, we don't jump short throws, as they belong to the underneath defenders, however, being able to anticipate routes and throws allows the put him in a position to make the interception and reduce unnecessary RAC.

If QB continues on drop (into 5-7 step), the corner is already in perfect position to turn and run (ala baseball turn), anticipating the deeper route (+12 yards).

If #1 goes vertical, he will simply baseball turn (bail) into the vertical stem, staying over the top of #1. This transition is the most important reason to use the shuffle as there is no wasted movement in going from square with a receiver to a 180 degree bail.

If #1 is shallow (hitch/out), immediately look to #2's stem (see first handout below)

• If #2 goes vertical, you must baseball turn to stay over the top of #2
• If #2 sticks at less than 10 yards (and #1 is shallow) like double hitch/curl/slant, now the corner can stick his downfield foot in the ground and jump #1.

The shallow stems on weakside (single) receivers, or against the double shallow quick routes - with the corner in a shuffle just applies the brakes to his upfield foot, rather than the rather cumbersome 'replace-the-feet' or 'T-step' regrouping to come out of his break and attack the ball.


The FS versus pro, is keying TE as he presents the first immediate inside vertical threat.

• If the TE is vertical after 10 yards, the FS can anticipate picking up the TE threatening the middle of the field
• If the TE releases outside, he can anticipate the weakside post or cross (dragon)
• If the TE releases inside, he can anticipate the strongside post or possibly help out on the weakside vertical route.

The FS versus doubles, is to key both inside vertical threats (Y & H) and is praying to God one of the underneath backers reroutes the vertical stem of either receiver. FS must respect both vertically in C3, which is why we stress the QB keys here.
http://sitekreator.com/brophyfootball6/main_page.html


Below is the first DVD handout for DBs after the first Spring scrimmage - going over alignment and handling pattern recognition with 2 receivers. This was a good example of "training the junior high" out of these guys, who would fixate on the single receiver in some pseudo-bastard man-cover 3 concept. More on video handouts can be read here, here, here, and here.

This next handout (Fall) reviewed how to break into the appropriate route (who and how) by reading the QB drop into the shuffle. This clip stressed understanding where the player should be based on the drop of the QB and the field of vision he was looking (which receiver).



This last clip was geared for FS's in Cover 3, primarily drilling the method of pre & post snap logic.



One other important aspect (briefly touched on during the handouts shown here) is alignment in 1-high defense. Divide the field into thirds, using your landmarks and field position as the guide.

For corners, the 'divider rule' is used which is premised on the top of the numbers being 9 yards from the sideline in high school (2 yard length of numbers). The landmark, or 'divider' (of the field) exists 1 yard inside the number (10 yards from the sideline) that the corner must align inside the receiver if he is formationed outside this landmark. The reason being, he is discouraging inside, vertical breaking routes that the FS will not be able to assist on. This allows all 3 deep secondary personnel to coordinate their help amongst each other to distribute the deep thirds appropriately.

Sweeping the game for the decade has been the fire zone. Not to be confused with the once mind-blowing "zone blitz", where zones are voided or exchanged with one or more players, the fire zone is a 5+ man pressure package coordinated with a 3-deep, 3-under coverage.

This type of pressure typically involves a "pirate" stunt (two pressure end linemen stunting inside) or a "long stick" where the playside end crashes all the way down two gaps inside. These DL stunts facilitate a protection overload (generally can get 4 rushers to a side) as well as help disguise defenders "coming from where they ain't". The entire premise of a fire zone is disguise and ambush. It is a feigned punch at the offense to set up the counter jab.

You can combine the rushers/blitzers in any fashion you like (as seen below in it’s many incarnations), but the strength (or weakness) of the concept is found in the SCIF (Seam-Curl-Flat) player, otherwise known as the BRONCO (coverage) player. These players (DE/LB/S) have to control the vertical release of any #2 receiving threat, become the force element in run, and/or reroute second crossers inside. Although simple on paper, what typically makes this so frustrating for offenses is the fact that this 1-high defense is presented pre-snap as MOFO (2-high, middle of the field open) coverage , coupled with the fact that those SCIF players could be played by a number of defenders (DEs, OLBs, Safeties, Corners), which would drastically muddy post-snap read/collision confirmation (“which one is the danger player to read”)?

To articulate how this translates to the offense, the quarterback sees a clear Cover 2 shell presnap read (MOFO). From this information, he is thinking his read for the hitch step will be based off the playside outside linebacker (#2 defender), playing the curl. Based off of what this defender does (flat, shallow, bail, deep, etc), the clear throw should be the opposite (which receiver will be open based on this reaction). The quarterback has played this textbook scenario over in his head thousands of times and is confident he knows the correct decision. In his drop, this coverage ‘danger player’ is blitzing! This creates an even easier, bullet-proof decision on where the ball should go because the player he is reading is not hesitating, not giving an incongruent read….this player is simply voiding his area leaving a space for an open receiver! The only problem is, with the fire zone, coverage is being rolled. That 2-high safety is now the curl-robber (where that blitzing LB left) coming down late and intercepting that once clear and easy throw…..crap!

Because of the versatility of this type of coverage (6 defenders to cover possible 5 receivers) the matchup zone concept is utilized to play the pattern distribution (where the receivers end up after their stem) and not the actual receivers themselves (I will cover this concept in greater detail in the next post, when I get more time next week).

All NFL and NCAA teams use fire zone concepts. A growing number of high schools are now using fire zones to confuse and constipate passing offenses. The gap exchange element of fire zones also remains sound as a run-blitz, as well.

In subsequent posts, we'll look at how the fire zone can adjust and adapt to various formations.

For more on how offense’s respond to the fire zone, check out the previous entries;
http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2009/07/putting-out-fire-zone-gunter-brewer_29.html
http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2009/07/putting-out-fire-zone-gunter-brewer.html
http://brophyfootball.blogspot.com/2009/07/herb-hand-will-eat-your-babies.html

In the download section, page 2, has two classic examples of fire zones to use and is available here;
http://sitekreator.com/brophyfootball/2.html

Below are more game situation usages of the fire zone in its many forms. C'est bon.