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Alex Gibbs: Stretch/Gun Run Developments (Part 2)

Part two of the chalk talk video.

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After covering Gibbs’ system and reviewing film examples in the first 4 ½ hours, the coaches assess Florida’s attempts at running zone-read and the feasibility of adding a give-read element to stretch from the gun (final 3 ½ hours).








We will follow shortly with an editorial post on the direction and choices many spread offenses have been  facing in recent years.

Alex Gibbs: Stretch/Gun Run Developments (Part 1)

gibbs
There are great coaches, legendary coaches, and then there is Alex Gibbs.

Alex Gibbs, while not the architect of zone and stretch, certainly became the patriarch of the most productive run concept in the past three decades.  Since “officially” retiring with Atlanta, but doing heavy consultation work with Houston and Seattle (and we can clearly see his thumbprints there), Alex Gibbs has remained an integral part in advancing the art of the run game.

Here may be the beginning and end to your education on stretch runs and how the concept has evolved through reduction in the past five years (and adapting itself to the proliferation of the gun).  Gibbs sits down with Steve Addazio (now head coach at Temple), Dan Mullen (now head coach at Miss State) and the rest of the Florida staff brainstorming how they can improve their gun run game after Chris Leak left.  Gibbs begins by explaining his entire system in great detail, going over the terminology that is integral to how his stretch runs are packaged, how his quarterback in Atlanta evolved the game, and the new challenges of today presented by defenses out of the gun (and more)…..



We will provide this video as a preface, offer up the second-half of the video later in the week, then follow-up with how many spread teams have codified their run game (and how it ties into what Mazzone is doing at Arizona State) into two distinct families (and the advantages of each).


Sit down, grab a notebook, and enjoy…..








Formation Matching: Bringing the Safety Down

Along with pursuit and tackling (fundamentals) of defense, is the rather academic application of adjusting your defense to the offensive threat you face. In most defenses the player that drastically alters what the defense actually is, the strong safety.

A lot has been discussed in the last 20 years ( in the wake of the evolution of 2-high defenses) about the role, prototype, and alignment of the “strong safety”. You likely hear this ad nauseum if you are forced to listen to any NFL broadcast, about “bringing a safety down”. Great, sure sounds awesome, but what does it mean and why?

This discussion will cover the ceaseless pendulum swing between offensive and defensive attacks and counterattacks that evolves each season. Back during your “daddy’s day” when receivers were in 3-point stances, everyone played with 2 backs and sometimes 3 backs in the backfield. To even the odds against this, defenses began stuffing more and more people in the box (1-high) to stop the run-heavy attacks.


To create more breathing room, offenses found a way to adjust by removing a back, forcing the defenses to expand with them (eliminating a defender from the box).

The more offenses expanded, the more defenses had to adjust and eventually relying on 2-high defenses to remain viable against the vertical passing game. The advent of 1-back looks (made popular by Dennis Erickson in the 80’s with WSU and Miami) became the (then) “spread”, even though Erickson admittedly says the entire point of going 1-back for him, was to RUN the ball. It may sound odd, but when we take a look at WHAT 1-back looks do to a defense, it becomes apparent what the offense is looking to exploit.

The fundamental element in defense is supporting all available run-gaps that an offense presents. If there is one gap not accounted for, then an offense has an immediate path for yardage. 2-high defenses became all the rage in the late 90’s into this current generation because of this 1-back adaptation. First things first, what is the offense presenting the defense? How many backs are in the ball game? How many tight ends?

“21” (2 backs, 1 tight end) typically gives you a 2-back, pro-formation look. With 2 in the backfield, you will likely be threatened by some type of 2x1 look. The extra man in the backfield (fullback / H-back) provides an extra gap for the defense to support (just like a second tight end). With 2-back looks, you are immediately threatened with lead runs (iso, power, sweep) that will put 1+ offensive player at the point of attack.



“11” (1 back, 1 tight end) will give you a single-back look. This immediately eliminates the threat of lead runs (unless you have to contend with the new [Rodriguez-type] spread, where the QB is a rushing threat). With only 1 back, you will end up with a 3x1 or 2x2 set that can stress a defense with 2 inside verticals (passing threat), but be without that extra (run fit) gap.

Although adjusting nicely and bottling up 1-back looks, the defense, through this expansion away from the ball, was opening the middle of the field. This became a void offenses would later exploit by turning shotgun ‘spread’ formations into run-heavy attacks.

The Next Step
Now to the current trend for defenses, how do they get an ‘extra hat’ at the point of attack (and beat the offense to the punch)? As outlined by people like Nick Saban, the MOFC defense allows a defense to put more defenders in the box and allocate the most people to stop the run, inside-out (protecting the middle of the field, first). To achieve both the security of covering the immediate threats of alignment (split) and also get the benefits of shutting of the middle of the field, defenses are finding ways to show 2-high, then bring a safety down late. From here, with pattern-matching principles, the sky is the limit for defenses and the way they attack the ball. With pattern-matching, you can now actually play “man”(to-man) as well as expand to match the passing threats. This arithmetic enables a defense to also bring 5+ man pressure, drop linemen in coverage, and or anything else you can dream up.

In the following clips below, you can see how personnel groupings essentially telegraph what formations you will see on a given play. In each example, the defense is going to play a 1-high MOFC coverage and bring the safety down for run-support/cover-down. The trick is, it typically is showing a 2-high look at the snap to play the traditional coverage-matchup-with-formation game that offenses are looking to exploit.
vs 21 personnel



vs 11 personnel


Then, you can get creative and not only protect the middle of the field, but also bring pressure (1-high fire zones).


This current trend of defenses gleaning the best attributes of schemes into some quasi-natural selection process creates a deadly and effective method for accounting for fundamental principles of good football. Defenses, with the usage of proper coverage support, pattern-matching principles, and multi-talented linemen (ability to drop to cover receiving threats), are able to open a maelstrom of disguised looks. Defenses can present one look at presnap and morph its use to fit any and all offensive threats after the snap. No longer are defenses limited by walking out on displaced receivers (in man) or staying cemented within the box to stop the run. With these principles of adaptation, the chalk can be held by defensive coordinators a while longer.

Florida Run Game

ZONE READ

read @ Yahoo! Video
ZONE (Quarterback)

Q Zone @ Yahoo! Video
ZOMBIE (Zone Lead)

Zombie @ Yahoo! Video
TRIPLE OPTION

triple @ Yahoo! Video
SPEED OPTION

POWER

DART


COUNTER

WINDBACK

Florida Fire Zone: Cowboy

COWBOY
Finally, the last type of field pressure, incorporates everyone’s favorite corner blitz.

Again, the defensive line “pirate” stunts away from the pressure side (nullifying any potential counter the offense would provide in adjusting protection to the bandit). This is actually the simplest of all their pressures, as the only adjustment is made by the free safety, who will sink to the weak /call side #1 receiver and rob any potential hot throw to him inside-out. The rest of the receiver disbursement is handled by the linebackers.



This is a great run-down / play-action pressure as all receiving threats are accounted for quickly while bottling up any outside / boot action.

The main rule (as with any corner blitz) is that the corner fires outside of #2 to ensure leverage on the passer. All receiving threats are accounted for regardless of formation.


UF COWBOY @ Yahoo! Video

Florida Fire Zone: Raider

RAIDER
This “gut” pressure meant to stuff the run as well as create problems for BOB protection, creates an interesting dilemma for offenses. By blitzing both the MLB and WLB, the center becomes overwhelmed with two rushers in A gap. He will look to take the MLB and likely leave the WLB for the remaining back, as well as gaining support from his guards. However, the guards will be looking to handle the nose and tackle, but these defenders are expanding outward (which will cause the guards to retreat and gain depth to look for other stunting linemen). BOB (big on big) protection puts the five offensive linemen against five immediate threat defenders (typically 4 down linemen + 1 MLB) with any additional threats (WLB) being picked up by a back. If you bring five men (against five), all it takes is for one offensive lineman to get beat (physically or by missed assignment) to ruin a quarterback's day. By overloading protections, you may leave one of those five without a man to block (giving the defense a free rusher).

The offense, if actually alerted to this pressure, will likely gap it down so the linemen account for the blitzing linebackers (releasing the back weak to account for the defensive end). This is fine, but the defensive line is stunting away from the interior pressure and the end the back is setting up in protection for, ISN'T rushing the passer (he is dropping to rob any #2 weak receiver).


With both the WLB and MLB now blitzing, the defense must somehow account for #2 and #3 strong. The SLB accounts for #2 strong and the strong safety now robs the middle hole (#3). Again, this is what makes the fire zone concepts so wickedly deadly to offenses (and why they are so pervasive in the game from the NFL on the way down to HS).

Florida Fire Zone: Steeler

Just like the pattern-matching coverage fuses the best of both man and zone defense, so does fire zone pressure.

Fusing the safety of zone coverage and the 5+ man pressure afforded with man coverage, fire zones become an efficient pathway to dismantling offenses. If you watch much football and take note of what is happening on defense, you'll notice that fire zones are actually run more on SECOND down, than "passing downs" (third and long). The reason being, fire zones, while effective pressures, are equally stout against the run (as well as more and more teams not waiting until third down to pass the ball).

Most fans interpret the pattern-matching fire zone by the SCIF (seam-curl-flat, the defender matching #2) player as just "man-to-man". This is likely because the common wives-tale of football is "you can't blitz (4+ pressure) without playing man-to-man". This was true back in the 80's when TV analysts became famous for spouting any old thing (while likely being true back then). For further details on fire zones previously outlined, be sure to check out "defense nu veaux" as well as how (prolific) offenses have learned how to adapt to beating fire zones and designing their game plans around them

STEELER

Florida's "Steeler" pressure consists of a strong side overload intended to stress BOB or turnback protection. With the #1 receiver being controlled and matched by the corners, the strong safety now can aggressively match #2 and rob any "hot" release he may provide the quarterback. So even if the Quarterback is alerted to "blitz", he still would be unsure of what / who will be where on the defense. The defense still shows a Cover 2 (MOFO) shell, but plays a Cover 3 / Cover 1 (MOFC) concept.

The real key here is that the entire defensive line is going to stunt away from the pressure, to allow the backside end to drop (it is assumed he is rushing by the offense, thereby committing a blocker to account for him) and immediately respond to any release by #2 away from the pressure. He will be responsible to control the seam and rob any inside, vertical throws to #2. The WLB away from the pressure now looks to rob the hole or expand to any #3 receiving threat. This theme, though carried out by various different players, remains consistent in the remaining fire zone pressures of Cowboy and Raider.



The clear advantage fire zones provide are;

  • Ability to overload a side for pass or run (more defenders than the offense can account for on one side of the ball)
  • Easily adjusted to get the most out of the pressure
  • Field defense so adjustments are locked in (and won't be broken, regardless of how the offense presents the formation)

As we explore further concepts, it is important to be mindful of whichever fire zone you choose to run, you must have a base defense out of it. There has to be a point of basic understanding your players are building off of and that they can relate these concepts to. Also, be careful of having too many fire zones. There should be a specific reason you have for running it. You will find that many of these can be consolidated to the three basic concepts outlined here (so there is no need to duplicate).

It isn’t what you know, it is what your players can execute.

For further exploration of fire zones, check out this site , that includes some classic examples of how they are utilized by defenses.


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