BLACK

I wasn’t quite sure if we captured the premise of the Iowa State lesson of schematic concision well enough in the last post.  Admittedly, it was an off-the-cuff editorial to a climactic match.  I also wasn’t sure if we have done a complete enough job to date on stressing the simplicity of concepts within an offense (hemlock has tackled this exceptionally well in previous posts), particularly as it relates to Noel Mazzone this fall.  Yes, we get that Arizona State has underperformed this season and Erickson will likely be gone at the end of this year (though it is a shame, considering how explosive their offense has been), but I don’t believe that discounts the value of learning what is working with Mazzone.

With this in mind and to serve as a type of sidebar edification on the matter, we’re “reposting” an exchange offered by hemlock and I on COACHHUEY (explaining Mazzone’s system).  So not to break the flow of dialogue (or require any actual work on my part) I’m leaving the posts as-is in the sequence they occured .  Hemlock’s thoughtful prose and profound commentary is in gold, while my rambling gibberish is in diarrhea green.

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** I realize some of the video (through Vimeo) hosted here is hard to come by.  If you are not aware of how to rip flash already, I’ll direct you to use Firefox and download the video add-on.  Start a video, then enable the download (and its yours).

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Noel Mazzone is Noel Mazzone. He has always been 1-back. What he's doing in Arizona, is essentially what he's always done, having evolved it through the years.

It IS zone-read, but its all controlled/filtered through a systematic way of horizontally stretching the defense, while at the core being vertically orientated (zone-read, F swing, Stick/Snag/Scat/Drive/Shallows/Verts/and tons of screens). There is an efficiency in his application (which is what we've been writing about) that is worth exploring (certainly doesn't carry near the amount of stuff Air Raid teams currently do). It isn't necessarily the plays themselves, but how they're packaged together and used as punch and counter-punch diagnosis.

How he teaches "the offense" is evident in what you've seen with Threet and Osweiller. They are lightening quick in throwing 3-step and 5-step that appears brutal on defenses (they know exactly what they are looking for based on the concept and process through it all).
I would resist calling Mazzone's offense an extension of the pro-single back. If the source of this thought is Mazzone's stint with the Jets in the NFL then I think it a little off. Too me it's evident that Mazzone went to the NFL not to make that his final destination but as a sort of intense sabbatical in that he went there to see what that game had to teach him. I think his goal was always to get back to the college game.

Brophy and I are going to be writing more about the offense in weeks to come, but here are few things to keep in mind: Mazzone wants to stress the defense's perimeter fulcrum. Watch the USC game; I don't think I have ever scene such transparent objectives in my life; they are constantly trying to widen the defense. When they widen the edge their inside zone game become effective, but you need to remember that it's not a real rugged zone game; they don't do combos and stuff; its only effective if they have one on one matchups. But stretching the defense horizontally also helps his vertical game, because it transforms zone into man.


The thing to remember is this too: they really only carry a few concepts every game, especially in their dropback package. More later...
The thing to remember about their zone game is this: it's bang or bust; if they don't win their individual matchups the play goes no where. Think about some the idiotic comments that Rod Gilmore made the other night. It asked why on second and ten did Mazzone run what he described as an "inside handoff" that went for nothing. Well, it was the right call for the front; they had the numbers to win but simply did not on that play. I like to think of it as "scat" zone. I know that sounds odd, but it's not an inside zone in the Alex Gibbs, Eliot Uzelac sense.

In a lot of ways I think that Mazzone is reviving some old things that Purdue did once upon a time. Think of how he motions his backs; it reminds me of how Purdue, WAZZU, and for that matter Miami of yesterday all motioned to empty as a way of stretching the defense's flanks in order to create windows underneath, but also to put backers and backs on virtual islands.

Also, think of how they use the bubble. People talk about the bubble as an extended hand off, but most teams really do not throw it well enough for it to be considered their stretch or wide zone play; not the case with ASU. I don't think I've seen a team that can run bubbles with the back, from 2x2, or 3x1 as effectively as they do regardless of the look. In a sense, the bubble is one of their plays that they feel that they can run versus anything to make critical yards, regardless of whether the defense knows what coming or not. Their third scoring drive the other night that came of the Vontez's pick was built almost entirely of of bubbles in one form or another.
Chris is right, there is nothing radical about what their doing. We will cover this in a post later in the season, but the one thing that they have done better than just about anybody is to accelerate the speed of their vertical game; when their on their game they throw verticals just as fast as quicks.
Yeah, in a sense it really is just that - big on big; they never really get to the second level; basically, its the back's responsibility to make the backer miss, which is what happens when they get big plays out of their zone game.

In terms of packages they carry, if you watch them closely they basically run four concepts from 2x2 and 3x1: Snag; 4 Verts, Y Cross, and Drive or Shallow. Not a huge Smash team in the conventional sense; when they hit the corner its coming off their 3-man snag a lot.

That said, they do tag the backside with a number of different combos, such as double post, post corner, Dig choice, etc.


Its really about an Economy of Concepts

If you're horizontally stretching a defense and emptying the box (to run.....and run easy) I suppose it isn't necessary to mash and bang with getting vertical movement on IZ and working combos (still not sure if I swallow this just yet) them running IZ will blow your mind ("wtf are they doing!?!") if you're accustomed to how IZ is traditionally run out of 1 back.

I would say that Alex Gibbs' one-cut rule is central to the success of the play in for Mazzone's back because of the nature of their scheme, which in part why the back aligns on the QB's heel rather than simply adjacent to him as he does in other zone gun schemes, such as Northwestern's, for example.

 
To build on Brophy's point, motion is used here in much the same way as it was used back in the day at Wyoming, Purdue, WAZZU, etc. Yes, it definately clarifies the read for the QB in that it tells him right away which side of the field he's going to work, especially in the Snag game, but it also is a way of putting extreme pressure on the number four to that side, the defense's fulcrum. It's another way of "controlling" this guy and making sure that he is out of the box, that he does not become a 1/5 player in the box.


Though most applications of ASU's offense are pretty basic in each game, the quirks against Oregon would be apparent for most coaches. Whereas most 7-man front defenses, Mazzone can pretty much give his quarterback a very clear picture. With Oregon's nickel/dime (2/1 DL) the picture was extremely cloudy with linebackers and safeties dropping into overhang positions. The heavy use of motion in that game was a product of getting Oregon to declare what they were truly running (where the safeties had to be.....and would the out-leverage themselves from helping their corners against the larger receivers). On the swing, it would primarily require the safety to make the stop because they were playing a heavy dose of C5 and rushing 4 or fire zoning and rushing 5.

What is interesting for coaches, was how Mazzone's system could adapt to it without losing it's shit. Facing something that was as different and that could get into and out of box threats pretty easy (from depth), ASU didn't have to do anything outside of themselves to handle it. With so many defenders outside the tackles on each snap, Oregon really was daring them to run inside and how ASU was hammering the flare/swing to open up the inside. If they threw the swing, it was going to have to be a safety to stop it (leaving X/Z pretty much 1-on-1) . I didn't find many times where Oregon didn't bring 5 every down, so it made the dig/shallow read pretty easy (either the WLB/MLB was widening for the swing or were both dropping to hook) .

What should be interesting for COACHES is not what they are doing but how they are processing the information on the field. Just by segmenting the defense, picking on one particular defender they can make some pretty safe assumptions on where everyone else will fit and who becomes the best ball carrier in that situation.


I think what we have to remember is that all spread offensive systems strive in some way or another to displace defenders and in the process place an inordinate amount of structural stress on the defense's force or alley players. Whether it's RichRod's spread option or Noel Mazzone's version, both offenses are really trying to hammer on a defenses adjuster backer, which in most 2 hi looks is going to be the sam, at least most of the time. RichRod does it with the Zone Read and Zone Bubble, as we've seen in the excellent talks that Brophy has posted on the blog. For Rich, it's really about trying to make sure that the adjuster never gets into the box, he's the guy they need to control. Mazzone too wishes to attack the adjuster, but his objectives are little different; yes, he wants to run inside zone, but, as Brophy noted, it's really more about identifying the defense's anchor player in order to diagnose not the scheme in general, but more importantly, the defense's individual matches, which, if you think about it, in the era of match-zone is more important than ever.

In a sense, it shows how motion is being used again not so much as a way of gaining mismatches and what not, the offense's general scheme already takes care of that, but of diagnosing what it is that the defense is doing. So, in a way, it just shows how we are coming full circle with the spread. Motion that was once jettisoned is now coming back as a tool for identifying a defenses seams and stress points.

Also, as was noted above, motion is not used blindly by Mazzone. In the Missouri game they hardly used motion because MU is fairly straightforward structurally; with Oregon, however, it was necessary.

We've covered this before quite a bit and Chris Brown knocks it out of the park when writing about the loaded backfield of Oregon and West Virginia but just documenting the trend that many teams are featuring heavy backfields out of the same "spread" 10 personnel groupings.



It goes to show that everything is cyclical and if you stay in the same spot (schematically) all you become is a stationary target.

On a somewhat personal note, I find you can discover so much more about actual 'coaching' from the programs that have to fight for wins.  It takes creativity, some guile, and a lot of hustle to manufacture plays that add up to wins when you're playing with a short deck.  While Tony Franklin will never be considered a face for the public, there is no denying his commitment to his players and his humble desire to win.  An interesting note to the season for La Tech is how much their offensive staff (in their first real season after recruiting) is relying on brand new faces to the program.  With transfers (WR) Quinton Patton and (OT) Oscar Johnson, to true freshmen (QB) Nick Isham, (RB) Ray Holley and (RB) Hunter Lee getting the bulk of responsibility in the past four weeks.

Believe it or not, we’re entering the fifth season of this blog, though only getting the hang of it for the last three.  That being said, the next few posts will lean heavily on archived content so not to insult any of you readers by retreading previous topics.

As we’ve covered before,  remaining gap-sound in run-support is a fundamental equation that is addressed every snap based on the formation.  In this post, we’ll look to set a foundation of defensive concepts through fragmentation.  After setting this ground work, it will be followed with different alternative coverage adaptations available to a defense.

One of the biggest mistakes for those learning the game of football is to fixate on the minutiae of various “brands” of defense.  Tying oneself to the dogmatic thinking and going-through-the-motions of “how we’ve always done it” without understanding the rationale of how it all works creates an intelligence rut that becomes a liability.  Defenses exist to defense an offense – they do not exist within vacuums.  On every play you’re defending something the offense is doing to advance the ball.  For this reason, defenses aren’t static entities – they must respond (adapt) to the stimuli they are presented with.   You will hear people declare, “we are a 3-4 Quarters defense” or something to that effect.  That’s great, but there is a reason a defensive concept is employed on a given down, and there is no catch-all defense available.

"Exhibit A"
Belichick on Defense

“At the Browns we played a 4-3,” Belichick said. “We won two Super Bowls playing a 4-3. In ’01 and (‘04). Second half of the ’01 season, we played 4-3 after Bryan Cox and (Ted) Johnson got hurt.”
“In all honesty, most people thought we played a 4-3 at the Giants,” Belichick said.

“Lawrence Taylor did a lot more rushing than he did pass dropping. He was probably 90 percent of the time, 80 to 90 percent of the time he was the rusher in the defense. Now not every play was a pass, but certainly in passing situations and on a lot of pass plays, he was the designated fourth rusher which really put us in what amounts to a 4-3. I think honestly that’s somethingthat’s a media fabrication. There are a lot of different alignments out there, you see 4-3 teams use odd spacing, you see 3-4 teams use even spacing.”

“Look, you have 11 players,” Belichick continued. “You can put them in various positions. Whether you want to put it in the pregame depth chart as one thing or another I think is a little bit overrated. You play different fronts, you play different spacings and you teach the techniques of your defense and that is what is consistent. The techniques that are taught in the different defensive systems, whichever one you want to talk about, are consistent within those systems.

A defense really just needs to be concerned about offensive numbers (and how to match them) and the offensive capabilities from their alignment.

While touched on a while ago with TCU’s split-field philosophy,  the divorcing of the secondary from the front minimizes the detail of checks a defense would need to concern itself with as well as compartmentalizing the teaching method for each player position.  While coverage and front remain related by arithmetic, they can become independent of one another and still function together seamlessly.


First things first is to match the front.  In every offensive formation you will have 5 offensive linemen, creating 6 gaps for an offense to attack.  The defense should have a plan to account for these 6 gaps presented, typically with 6 defenders (i.e. “the box”).  If we (continue to) use the 42 Nickel as a base concept (all of this remains true if you’re a 4-3, 3-4, 33, 50, etc), your bare minimum in the box will be 6 defenders that won’t ever have a reason to “break” their alignment because they ARE the box (they are the minimum gaps being defensed).

As more offensive players are introduced into the box, they create additional areas of attack through leverage (gaps).  The defense will fundamentally respond by adding more defenders to this area or risk being out-numbered at the point of attack.



Adding an additional back or tight end to the formation creates even more running lanes, necessitating yet another defender into the box to compensate.


All of this becomes a very academic application that generally gives you a clue as to what and how an offense is trying to set up its next play;

• if you get 1-back you’ll have 7 gaps
  
• if you get 2-back you’ll have 8 gaps

It also lays a conceptual ‘budget’ for the coordinator.  If you get X personnel grouping, you need to respond with Y defensive package and anticipate a limited selection of attacks.

After addressing the numbers in the box, you will have to figure out what you’re going to do with those other guys left in the secondary.   For the remainder of this post (and subsequent posts), we will ignore the box defenders and fragment our discussion into the leftovers of the formation.
With 1-back, we’ll have 2x2 (4 immediate vertical threats) and 5 defenders to match them.
With 2-back, we’ll have 3 immediate vertical threats with (essentially) 4 defenders to compensate.  With 2-back (or 3x1), you can get away with doing some flexible things to the single-split side without carrying tremendous risk.

Like we discussed in the earlier TCU 2-Read post, we’re going to narrow our focus on the 3-on-2 matchup to the slot receiver side.  When the defense is presented with two split receivers it faces an immediate horizontal stretch (away from the box) while being threatened with a vertical / levels attack.

Fortunately, because of the numbers advantage, there are several ways to play this set between these three defenders (with each having distinct advantages).  Keep in mind, the variations listed below could plug-and-play any one of these defenders into a role (hence the multiplicity in how slot is treated).

You could feature 1 underneath force player and 2 deep coverage defenders (sky, cloud,  buzz).  This could be country Cover 3, quarter-halves, or bracket coverage on the #1 receiver.
You could have 1 deep defender over the top of 2 underneath defenders.  This could be anything such as traditional Cover 2, robber or bracket coverage on #2.
Or have 1 deep defender with 1 underneath (seam) defender that could be Quarters (Meg) or fire zone.

Or it could simply be man-under coverage with deep help.
All of these alternatives can be played from one defensive (presnap) alignment, yet create a world of hurt if an offense filtered their throws through defender reads.

A feature of this exposition should be to illustrate how "what TCU does" (in the secondary) is actually what every other defense (NCAA/NFL) does - they both end up in the same scheme when its all said and done.  With TCU's patented "3 coverages", you end up with a combination of 9 coverages available (2, Blue, 5, 25, 2 Blue, Blue 5, Blue 2, 5 Blue, 52).  All of this is a result of how the slot is played.  Whether you are the Horned Frogs, the New York Giants, or the San Diego State Aztecs.....whatever scheme you call yourself playing; you arrive at the same destination.

With this preface set, in the next few posts we will discuss the many different slot coverage adaptations available to a defensive coordinator.  We’ll explore how they work within the overall scheme, why it is advantageous to not only treat slot sets differently, but also how to effectively keep quarterbacks guessing when confronted with all the variations the defense can give them.

Since the end of the bowl season I’ve noticed a number of threads on various sites devoted to the quick game. Given the fact that we are living through the “Spread” age in football this hardly comes as a surprise. What is surprising, however, is the number of posts in which coaches speculate as to how relevant a quick game package is to an offense that bases out of the gun anyway. After all, should it not be possible to simply build your quick package into your basic 5 step package anyway, either via hots, sight-adjustments, or some form or the other of flare control?

There are six reasons why one needs to throw quick:
1. Horizontal Stretch
2. Force defensive numbers to be even in the box.
3. Force hard support control
4. Identify the leverage on the perimeter.
5. Find where the defense is not on the field.
6. Blitz control.

I think relationship between reasons one and two is pretty obvious. If you are a spread team, operating in a four-wide environment, the quick game functions as a way to structurally set the defense and to get an idea as to how the defense is going to defend the box. In a sense, your quick package should do for you what double-tight does for an ACE team in that it should force the defense to balance up, which should enable the offense to get a hat-on-a-hat in both the running and passing games. In other words, the horizontal stretch the quick game creates should prevent overloads from occurring in one form or another. In so doing, the quick game also enables you to identify the specific areas in a given defensive structure that you will want to isolate and exploit by way of the five-step game.

In the same way that one and two work together, so do three and four. If you create a good horizontal stretch and even the defense the defense will begin to play hard support, thus flattening the under coverage out, creating, in effect, more man to man situations in which defenders will, by the leverage of their technique, be in a less effective position to play good run support. In addition, this will clarify the defense’s leverage and subsequent pursuit angles.

Reason five, I believe, helps explain why the quick game is an invaluable tool: it helps identify, at early stage in any game, where defenders are and where they are not. In this sense, the quick game is tool for probing that helps an offense identify where along a broad defensive front it should concentrate its spearheads.

Blitz control, reason six, albeit important, is not, in my opinion, the primary reason one should throw quick. Yes, it’s imperative that an offense have the ability to get the ball off quickly off of a short drop, but certainly there are other tools an offense has at its disposal that can not only serve as a blitz deterrent, if desired, but that are a more sure fire way to make a defense pay for blitzing, such as screens, for example.

In a place of a conclusion, I would like to say a word or two about how the quick game figures into the historical evolution one-back offenses. I know this will sound like ancient history, but the one-back offense, as we understand it today, in the modern post-Jack Elway / Pink Erickson sense (and for those that don’t know, Pink is Dennis’ father), developed out of a desire to find an easy and economically teachable way to spread the ball out to the perimeter in order to displace defenders and open the running game. What people forget is that the passing game of the modern one-back offense, the one that Dennis Erickson popularized throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s, but not the one he runs today at ASU with Noel Mazzone, revolved around a vertical stem quick game whose main objective was to create a horizontal stretch that would displace the Sam backer, create a 4-2 box, but one with a two hi shell that would enable the offense to run a power inside and outside zone running game, preferably to the low shade of the defense. So, even in its modern beginnings, the quick game was really not designed as a way to beat the blitz, but rather as means to an end for running the football.

In my next posting, I will talk at some length about the questions a staff needs to ask itself as it conceptualizes its program’s quick package.

An episode of Frontline (“Football High”) aired last week and it has been making its rounds through the football interwebs and rightfully so. It touches many of the various issues that have established themselves as the fingerprint of our current era of high school football.  The piece did it’s best in the short time allotted to address a litany of themes in today’s game that cannot be ignored (despite our best efforts in some cases).  Because of time constraints, the editors had to settle for a shotgun-method of presenting these affairs to the public, sacrificing quantity over depth.  I wanted to take a bit of space to highlight and briefly comment (I don’t have any answers) on a few of the concerns presented.

• Program Building and the influence of pressure
• Player size consistently increasing to proportions not previously experienced
• Concussions being taken seriously with increased research addressing brain trauma (see links below)
• Impact and the role of equipment to mitigate unnecessary injury - Tom Talavage, Purdue University
• Cumulative effects of small impacts to the head – Dr. Ann Mckee, Boston University
• Safety Enforcement – absence of trainers to professional evaluate athletes (due to budget / lack of regulation)

Player Safety (and the perspective in which we regard coaches)


Easterbrook makes an astute observation here and it was just worth repeating.  I found the commentary right before this excerpt more deflating (decreasing availability of athletic trainers), but his point about how we value coaches succinctly captured what this epidemic is all about. 

Mega Programs from Mega Churches
At the risk of being offensive and pissing off every reader, I believe there is something here that I feel deserves a closer look.  I don’t think there is some boogeyman conspiracy at play, but there IS a formula available (and being used across the Nation) which is able to tie (affluent) money, cutthroat competitiveness, and shameless ego into a maelstrom of domination.

For the record, I have nothing but respect and admiration for the Shiloh Christian (and the many private schools built with this same model) Program and I’m not even suggesting that they aren’t doing everything above board.  The Frontline piece just happened to pick them, but there are dozens of other programs that could’ve been the focus for what they were illustrating.

If you had the means and ability to create the best possible environment for your students, why wouldn’t you? Wouldn’t it be your duty to do exactly that (and why not for your athletes as well)?  I am not even one of those guys who begrudges the disparity between public versus private school programs.  There are many public schools that are run in near the same fashion.  This “formula” that I’m referring to requires a perfect balance which isn’t easy to come by and when lacking oversight from outside parties (away from the self-contained echo-chamber of “win”) it becomes a monster that grows, breeding abuse.

Limitless Potential for High School Programs
I don’t know who the hell Walt Williams is, nor can I speak for his title, but everything he explained was dead on the money.  This is a subject I’ve shared with my close coaching friends the past few years (especially every time I hear the lazy excuse of “players can’t do such-and-such”).  High school football really is wide open on what we can get away with and how coaches can creatively use their time on campus (and off).  Again, like mentioned above, it straddles the line of being competitive and being unethical.  There are many things we, as coaches, can do to saturate our players with skills and knowledge to build them as players (with little regulation), but finding the right mix between too much and not enough can be a moving target.

This all comes back to Bill Withers at the opening of this post.  The allure and euphoria that is American football is something that really transcends rational thought.  The “football high” (intentional double entendre) speaks to the compulsive nature that is created because these visceral life moments and may not be something we can soberly evaluate like an economic equation.  Football, the game, will eat up players and coaches alike without ever returning the ‘love’ / investment made by the participant.  The fever of “the game” always comes at a price and something we can all easily lose sight of…. it isn’t the stats, the scores, the wins or losses.  It is the relationships with the players and with yourself (what you end up revealing about your own character).

That isn’t to dismiss any of the legitimate concerns presented by this piece (quite the contrary),  but for any person who has played high school or college ball and “got it” (the experience), the decision to jeopardize our health and in some cases, peace of mind, is one we wouldn’t even second-guess.  The thrill and fulfillment of sacrificing yourself for the benefit of those close to you (and those people sharing alike), to create something bigger than all of you combined is ultimately what this game is about.

I’m not coaching (again) this year.   Part by choice – part by schedule (conflict).  When you are away from the frying pan, you are afforded the luxury of a perspective without any critical timeline.  When  you’re not confronted with an instant-response requirement to develop a plan for the next game or (during the spring) the next season’s practice structure anything can seem like a good idea.   During the spring, your team is full of potential and beaming with unchallenged optimism.  You will try new things, looking for any edge you can find to become even better than you were last season to improve your players performance to a higher, more efficient level.

Along that mindset, something that has been on my mind for a few months after stumbling upon an enlightening book,  “The Tell-Tale Brain",  by Dr. V. S. Ramachandran, and his theory of the “mirror box”.  Its an amazing discovery, though simple in concept.

The patient put his phantom limb on the nonreflecting side of the mirror and his normal arm on the reflecting side of the mirror. When the patient then looked at the reflecting side, it appeared as if the phantom limb had returned. (It was, in fact, a reflection of the patient's existing arm.)

"If the patient then starts moving his hand, clapping his hand or conducting an orchestra or waving goodbye while looking in the mirror, he's going to see the mirror reflection of the normal hand superposed on the phantom, moving in command with the command sent to the phantom arm," says Ramachandran. "So you're going to get the visual illusion that the phantom limb is obeying the command."

Though patients know intellectually that their phantom limbs have not returned, they are able to successfully trick their brains into thinking that their limbs have returned.

"It not only looks like it's there, it feels like it's there," says Ramachandran. "Patients say, 'When I move my normal hand, the phantom arm looks like it's moving. When I open the normal fist, the phantom hand — whose fist I could not open for months — suddenly feels as if it is opening as a result of the visual feedback, and the painful cramp goes away.' This is a striking example of modulation of pain signals by vision."

Dr. V.S. Ramachandran, called the "Marco Polo of neuroscience" by Richard Dawkins, is the author of several books on the brain, including Phantoms in the Brain: Probing Mysteries of the Human Mind and A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness: From Impostor Poodles to Purple Numbers. He gave the 2003 BBC Reith Lectures and has published more than 180 papers in scientific journals including Nature and Science.

 

So, I’ve  just been simmering on that concept for the past five months or so, thinking, “Hey, could this be helpful with coaching?”.  It was also during this time that I was fully immersing myself in Coach Mark Rodriguez’s 4D-FTP transition / footwork methods. 

Yeah, sounds good and if it works, you’d look like a genius.  So the question is, it may work for the neurologist quack and his fancy book-learnin’, but is there any practical use in the “real world”?

Well, when you stop and think about it – yes, there is, and its quite common.  Skilled dancers relyon instant reinforcement of mirrors in dance studios all the time.  Without it, performers may feel like they’re doing a great job, but quite possibly contorting themselves into horribly inefficient movements. 

Also, think of the (real) purpose of all those mirrors in the gym.   No, they aren’t for you to practice your pose down for the Arnold Classic, but to reinforce strict form on your concentric/eccentric movements.  So, yeah…..I guess it IS a common practice when training the body to perform an action.

I’ve always appreciated (and stressed the need for) filming practice and drill work to reinforce/review technique with players. While it has been helpful, I find the lack of immediate response rather deflating. Sure, you get to see what went wrong, what is correctable, but it usually requires another practice session hours away (or 24 hours after viewing) for an opportunity to get it right (then go through the same process, if audible cues aren’t successful). The point is – if you can get an immediate stimulus to how you (as an athlete) are performing, you could ‘self-correct’ instantly. The athlete could take cues not just from what a coach is telling him, but he would see and feel the peak body position.

How could it be used? The key to technique is in the minutiae of movement; leverage, body position, feet and hips. I’m thinking foot placement ladder drills for DBs (or the 4D weave drills) or OLine stance/starts. Anything where you’re just concentrating on few movements in a short space. The player obviously would have to be in an environment where you are not pressed for time (so I’m thinking pre-practice), won’t be making contact, and where the eye-level/focus can be sacrificed to reinforce body position (in the mirror).

If I were coaching this spring, I was planning on just using a simple full-length mirror (that you could get cheaply at any department store), place it horizontally along a DB ladder. With the player’s eye level through the mirror, they can see each step as they take it, and ensure they aren’t over striding, and are effectively placing their toes on the ground. You obviously wouldn’t use it in every drill, just when you’re trying to build those fundamental psycho-motor responses that are intuitive in great game performers.

 

What are the drawbacks?

1. It is different.
   
2. It requires the athlete’s eye’s be diverted to a focal point you may not want to reinforce (if eyes are down for below-the-waist training).
   
3. May not see an immediate (if any) benefit (you’re training muscle-memory…it is long-term process).
   
4. Out on the field, equipment (mirror) is fragile and could cause a real mess. This is something probably reserved for indoors / at the Field House.

I don’t know – maybe I’m just completely full of it.  Let us know what you think. It could help or it could be just a huge waste of time.

Something that has intrigued me this past year is how more and more teams have been using untraditional personnel groupings (nickel/dime). Now what they do out of these packages isn’t all that mind-blowing. What I do intend to learn from this trend is

1. how the front integrity remains sound (how the gaps are accounted for) and
2. how their proliferation relates to teaching methodology (it remains consistent with everything they already do).

Now this post won’t contain any answers – I’m just passing along some things that have piqued my curiosity. Be sure to check out blitzology if you’re interested in getting practical insight now.
I am certainly open to any insight. I am most intrigued by how Dom Capers has been using this (loved his work with the Panthers, plus he was with Saban in Miami) and in particular, the use/technique of the 2 defensive linemen (not ‘Psycho’). I am more intrigued by this because of how the DTs handle the interior gaps as well as the use of standup linebackers on the edge (that puts you in a real 42 because that is how personnel is used, anyway, with no true defensive ends in great supply). TCU has been doing this more and more against 1-back gun offenses because there is little threat of being 'blown off the ball' or out-leveraged when standing up (to the field).

I feel there are certain known factors that provide clues towards what is actually taking place and that would be as follows;

1. The offensive personnel groupings have no bearing on when these are used. 21 / 11, pro, double-tights……it makes no difference.
2. I am not quite certain how much ‘field’ and ‘boundary’ has any true relevance concerning the tendency with these groupings. The NFL hashes only give you a little over 9 feet of difference between the area of the field, so I don’t believe there would be a true game plan based on this
3. Because of the assumption of #2, I would believe that pressure is designated by formation splits and/or back set, as this would be the better indicator of protection.
4. #3 gives credence to the effectiveness of fire zone/blitz pressure (catch man) coverage, where it can provide ‘unbreakable’ answers, rather than playing double coverage calls (pro/twins).
5. The modular approach to the fire zone (hot 3, SCIF, deep hole, etc) means you can plug-and-play any defender into a role to come up with a myriad of options to cover 5 receiving threats. It is this approach that I feel will be what most of us (coaches) can use to improve how we teach the game and include more players in the game.
6. With only 2 defensive linemen in the front and the center never being covered (usually double 3 techniques) , my completely unfounded assumption would be that these guys are playing a heavy (2 gap) technique (which is really becoming prevalent). This also aides in muddying the Mike declaration for 5 and 6 man protection. Though this initial thought may be incorrect or their reads have become incredibly effective in controlling the playside gap. Actually, it is how the 2 DL contribute to controlling the front that has me the most intrigued because it doesn't appear that the 5-7 technique backers are that integral to gap-integrity (as in, they are either controlling the gaps with the pirate stunts associated with fire zone or are looking to spill everything to the SCIF or sideline in man).

Of course, any or all of these assumptions may be incorrect, but if I can find anything we can take away from this I’ll pass it along. It goes without saying that the NFL (game) is primarily about key players that allow you to do things most every other team cannot. Meaning, a good portion of this could be just the by-product of having freaks on your defense.


The constant at the lower levels (particularly high school) is that :

1. Your best personnel IS your best personnel, meaning your ‘base’ defense is usually your only defense and if you can sub with considerable competent depth on defense, you are in the minority.
2. Your effectiveness on defense is relative to the quality of opponent you face. If you face offenses that are relatively 1-dimensional and/or do not vary much on down and distance, then situational game planning with personnel groupings like these can be hit or miss.

Additional thoughts....