BLACK

No i've not defected from the House of Genesis to another brand but i am gonna have to give some love to Conrad at Sandman Bikes in Belgium.

One of my favourite things in live is the internet... no not the vast XXX rated content.. the ability to track down the weird and wonderful parts you need to finish the build that you have put together in your head.. you know exactly how you want it to go together and how it will work but alot of the time there are no mainstream sources for the little or big parts you need.

Madison for 99% of the time can supply me with everything my little heart desires but when building a special variety of bike you got to look to all corners of the bike speaking world to get the bits you need.

After looking at Surly's Pugsley i was convinced i needed to be able to swap my front and rear wheel... both for quick ratio changes but also in the event of a freewheel failure i would have another.... Pug forks however are offset to no use on a normal frame... some forum searching took to me to Italy and a company called Sandman bikes.. the webpage held little info but promised alot with pics of a full fat bike... i emailed.... within a day an email came back.. forks were sitting waiting... they were a mere 80 euros a pair and within a week or so i had 2 pairs in my hand... problem solved.






Big thanks Conrad but what am i gonna do now with my spare time with no forks to find :)

The New Orleans Saints, since Sean Payton’s arrival in 2006, have been looking to aggressively attack defenses at will. Like a good batch of boudin, Payton uses as many ingredients as he can get his hands on. Last night, they were afforded the stage and competition to show off his patented recipe.

Today, we’ll take a look at two plays, in particular, that illustrate the mastery of Brees attacking the oft-mentioned fire-zone blitz, as well as 1-high man-free coverage (both concepts detailed considerably before on here).

The first example includes a 5-man pressure, bringing the nickel from the edge (on top of #2 into the field). Presnap, the Patriots show a 2-high coverage shell, with the press alignment on #2 and corners squatting in the flat. Brees points out the MLB (the +1 to the 3 down linemen and the linebacker crept up in the weak B gap), who would be assumed to be the potential blitzer (since both #2 weak and #3 strong have defenders on them in 'man' coverage). This would put the offensive linemen accounting for the nose, both ends, and the tight weak inside linebacker, leaving the right guard free to account for the MLB and/or assist with the nose. Only thing is, the MLB begins walking out to gain leverage on #3 (strong), who's aligned as a wing (in empty).

This is an alert that not everything is as it seems.

At the snap, the weak inside linebacker showing blitz bails to the middle hole and (should be) looking to #3 or any crossers to rob. The field side End and Nose pirate stunt inside to gain leverage for the blitzing nickel on the edge and the boundary outside linebacker is also blitzing.

Where things go wrong (for the Patriots) is that the SCF player to the field is peeking inside (like he should be taking the hole). He fails to control the vertical stem of Henderson (#19) as he goes up the field. Making matters worse, the FS attempts to (over) compensate for the dropping strong safety (to the boundary) who's going to cover-down the #2 threat (who expands to the flat). With no immediate vertical threat by #2 weak, there is no weak receiver to respect, and with 3 receivers to the field side, the FS really should have been looking to match the immediate threats on Henderson's side.


breesus @ Yahoo! Video
The second example simply illustrates victimization of Cover 1 out of a 2-back set. Much like the Orange/Tan looks we detailed earlier, New England is going to present 2-high (MOFO) then screw the strong safety down late to get 8 in the box to stop what would be a predictable run down (2 tight ends, 2 running backs).

With flow action, the linebackers keying #2 and #3 weak, the Saints are able to sucker them in to create the high-low conflict on the remaining free safety with a Post-Dig combo. The free safety bites on the Dig as it opens behind the linebackers, leaving the middle-of-the-field-breaking Robert Meachum, who already has out-leveraged his corner inside. Because the corner was expecting (rightfully so) inside help from the free safety, he assumed he could play Meachum in a low-shoulder trail position.


free @ Yahoo! Video




Of course, some folks jess don't have the stomach for Cajun cuisine.....

PS

Hats off to Randy Moss for perfecting the Johnny Walker Lindh beard-look. Not many can pull that off as well as he has.

Along with pursuit and tackling (fundamentals) of defense, is the rather academic application of adjusting your defense to the offensive threat you face. In most defenses the player that drastically alters what the defense actually is, the strong safety.

A lot has been discussed in the last 20 years ( in the wake of the evolution of 2-high defenses) about the role, prototype, and alignment of the “strong safety”. You likely hear this ad nauseum if you are forced to listen to any NFL broadcast, about “bringing a safety down”. Great, sure sounds awesome, but what does it mean and why?

This discussion will cover the ceaseless pendulum swing between offensive and defensive attacks and counterattacks that evolves each season. Back during your “daddy’s day” when receivers were in 3-point stances, everyone played with 2 backs and sometimes 3 backs in the backfield. To even the odds against this, defenses began stuffing more and more people in the box (1-high) to stop the run-heavy attacks.


To create more breathing room, offenses found a way to adjust by removing a back, forcing the defenses to expand with them (eliminating a defender from the box).

The more offenses expanded, the more defenses had to adjust and eventually relying on 2-high defenses to remain viable against the vertical passing game. The advent of 1-back looks (made popular by Dennis Erickson in the 80’s with WSU and Miami) became the (then) “spread”, even though Erickson admittedly says the entire point of going 1-back for him, was to RUN the ball. It may sound odd, but when we take a look at WHAT 1-back looks do to a defense, it becomes apparent what the offense is looking to exploit.

The fundamental element in defense is supporting all available run-gaps that an offense presents. If there is one gap not accounted for, then an offense has an immediate path for yardage. 2-high defenses became all the rage in the late 90’s into this current generation because of this 1-back adaptation. First things first, what is the offense presenting the defense? How many backs are in the ball game? How many tight ends?

“21” (2 backs, 1 tight end) typically gives you a 2-back, pro-formation look. With 2 in the backfield, you will likely be threatened by some type of 2x1 look. The extra man in the backfield (fullback / H-back) provides an extra gap for the defense to support (just like a second tight end). With 2-back looks, you are immediately threatened with lead runs (iso, power, sweep) that will put 1+ offensive player at the point of attack.



“11” (1 back, 1 tight end) will give you a single-back look. This immediately eliminates the threat of lead runs (unless you have to contend with the new [Rodriguez-type] spread, where the QB is a rushing threat). With only 1 back, you will end up with a 3x1 or 2x2 set that can stress a defense with 2 inside verticals (passing threat), but be without that extra (run fit) gap.

Although adjusting nicely and bottling up 1-back looks, the defense, through this expansion away from the ball, was opening the middle of the field. This became a void offenses would later exploit by turning shotgun ‘spread’ formations into run-heavy attacks.

The Next Step
Now to the current trend for defenses, how do they get an ‘extra hat’ at the point of attack (and beat the offense to the punch)? As outlined by people like Nick Saban, the MOFC defense allows a defense to put more defenders in the box and allocate the most people to stop the run, inside-out (protecting the middle of the field, first). To achieve both the security of covering the immediate threats of alignment (split) and also get the benefits of shutting of the middle of the field, defenses are finding ways to show 2-high, then bring a safety down late. From here, with pattern-matching principles, the sky is the limit for defenses and the way they attack the ball. With pattern-matching, you can now actually play “man”(to-man) as well as expand to match the passing threats. This arithmetic enables a defense to also bring 5+ man pressure, drop linemen in coverage, and or anything else you can dream up.

In the following clips below, you can see how personnel groupings essentially telegraph what formations you will see on a given play. In each example, the defense is going to play a 1-high MOFC coverage and bring the safety down for run-support/cover-down. The trick is, it typically is showing a 2-high look at the snap to play the traditional coverage-matchup-with-formation game that offenses are looking to exploit.
vs 21 personnel



vs 11 personnel


Then, you can get creative and not only protect the middle of the field, but also bring pressure (1-high fire zones).


This current trend of defenses gleaning the best attributes of schemes into some quasi-natural selection process creates a deadly and effective method for accounting for fundamental principles of good football. Defenses, with the usage of proper coverage support, pattern-matching principles, and multi-talented linemen (ability to drop to cover receiving threats), are able to open a maelstrom of disguised looks. Defenses can present one look at presnap and morph its use to fit any and all offensive threats after the snap. No longer are defenses limited by walking out on displaced receivers (in man) or staying cemented within the box to stop the run. With these principles of adaptation, the chalk can be held by defensive coordinators a while longer.